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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, domestic and international actors have become increasingly attentive to the 
social and political issues caused by foreign corrupt practices.1 Corrupt payments made to 
foreign public officials harm the recipient state’s socio-political environment by undermining the 
legitimacy of the rule of law and fortifying the position of a bureaucratic elite.2 In doing so, 
corruption impedes the growth of domestic markets by distorting competition and imposing 
inefficient and unaccountable rents on international commerce. As a result, corruption presents a 
threat to long-term development and may cultivate economic instability, which ultimately 
undermines the incentive for multinational corporations to invest and operate in such 
jurisdictions. 
 
This paper approaches corruption from a law and economics perspective, as a phenomenon that 
can be understood through the concept of supply and demand. Due to jurisdictional limitations, 
the domestic regulation of foreign corrupt practices is generally limited to regulating the conduct 
of the party supplying the bribe.  The state actor demanding the bribe is generally beyond the 
reach of Canadian officials. Recognizing the limits associated with the regulating only one side 
of corrupt transaction, this paper focuses on mechanisms that aim to reduce the ‘supply’ of such 
payments.  Based on an analysis of existing hard law mechanisms, including criminal provisions 
and the Canadian Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (“Canadian CFPOA”) this paper 
proposes a broader model for the regulation of foreign corrupt practices which combines existing 
hard-law measures with soft-law corporate and securities regulatory structures designed to 
induce enterprise-wide compliance and attitudinal shifts among market participants.  In doing so, 
this model frames the payment of bribes to foreign public officials a matter not only of criminal 
law, but also of corporate compliance. It recognizes that effective anti-corruption strategies 
require the cooperation from both individuals in the position to provide illegal payments as well 
as more senior corporate officials who set organizational culture and manage risk.   
 
Criminal enforcement of the Canadian CFPOA faces significant jurisdictional and practical 
limitations.  In particular, given that the offending conduct of providing payments to foreign 
public officials is likely to occur outside of Canada’s territorial jurisdiction, domestic law 
enforcement officials are limited in their ability to detect, investigate and prosecute international 
corruption. When corruption is detected abroad, Canadian officials only have jurisdiction to 
prosecute Canadian citizens or residents involved in the transaction.3 Recognizing these current 
limits associated with domestic enforcement of foreign corrupt practices and the difficulties 
inherit in developing truly transnational regulatory framework, the authors recommend the 
development of a more comprehensive regulatory structure to prevent Canadian involvement in 
corruption abroad.   Focusing on corruption from a corporate compliance perspective, the authors 
suggest that incorporating legal instruments such as directors’ fiduciary duties and disclosure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  See: The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials” (November 21, 1997); United Nations, “Convention Against Corruption” (October 31, 2003) Resolution 58/4; and The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Recommendation for Further Combating the Bribery of Foreign 
Pubic Officials (December 9, 2009).  
2 See: Toke S. Adit, “Corruption, institutions and economic development” (2009) 29:2 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 271; 
John Brademas & Fritz Heimann, “Tackling International Corruption: No Longer Taboo” (1998) 77 Foreign Aff 17 at 18.  
3 Chowdhury v. Canada, 2014 ONSC 2635. 
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obligations, which are well understood regulatory tools in corporate and securities law, will help 
promote a culture of compliance within Canadian corporations. These tools will encourage 
companies to develop internal control mechanisms to prevent corruption, and will help to 
balance enforcement costs between market participants and government regulators and facilitate 
a bottoms up approach to addressing foreign corruption by Canadian corporations. In sum, this 
paper provides a novel analysis that synthesizes principles of economics and corporate 
governance to provide fresh insights into supply side regulatory models in the context of white-
collar crime enforcement.   
 
This paper proceeds as follows. In Part II, we provide an overview of the regulation of corruption 
by discussing the theoretical basis for regulating the conduct of corporations operating abroad.  
We also compare the Canadian CFPOA to domestic corruption legislation and analyze the 
jurisdictional and geopolitical limits on Canada’s ability to prosecute both the supply of and 
demand for bribes. In Part II, we also compare the Canadian CFPOA to the United States’ 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“U.S. FCPA”)4 and United Kingdom’s Bribery Act (“U.K. 
Bribery Act”).5 In doing so, the role of compliance based regulatory structures in the curbing 
corruption are highlighted.   Then in Part III, we evaluate the enforcement framework for the 
Canadian CFPOA and provide an analysis of existing Canadian CFPOA jurisprudence.  Our 
analysis highlights the need for greater enforcement intensity and clearer guidance for law 
enforcement, prosecutors and judicial officials in Canada when investigating, prosecuting and 
sanctioning this conduct.  Part IV presents a series of proposals designed to strengthen the 
effectiveness of the Canadian CFPOA through the use of corporate law fiduciary duties and 
securities law disclosure requirements designed to enhance compliance and promote a culture of 
compliance within these organizations. Part V concludes. 
2. Regulating Corruption 
 
The transaction underpinning the provision of a bribe can be understood through basic economic 
principles of supply and demand.  When such a transaction is regulated, the economics of this 
bargain may shift as the risk weighted costs and benefits to each party may be altered due to the 
regulatory intervention.  Inconsistent regulation of the supply and demand side of corrupt 
transactions presents challenges for the regulation of foreign corrupt practices and highlights the 
limitations of hard-law criminal enforcement mechanisms in these circumstances.  This section 
evaluates existing regulatory structures addressing corruption in the domestic context in Canada 
and foreign corrupt practices legislation in the United States and United Kingdom.  
 
a. Theory on the Regulation of Foreign Corruption Practices 
 
Global development and the efficient allocation of social resources depends on free and fair 
competition among independent actors.  To this end, government intervention through 
regulation, the provision of government contracts or licensing requirements should be awarded 
on the basis of the relative merits or qualifications of the applicants rather than extraneous 
factors, which might skew the decision making process.  When an economy falls victim to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, et seq.) (United States).  
5 Bribery Act 2010 (c. 23) (United Kingdom). 
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rampant corruption, market based competition may be distorted and systemic barriers may be 
imposed on the ability of new participants to grow their market-share.6 
 
This section evaluates the basis for criminalizing the payment of bribes to foreign public officials 
by considering the economic justifications for countries to regulate the conduct of their 
companies operating abroad.  Based on a review of this literature, the authors observe that there 
are compelling economic justifications for developed states to regulate the ability of their 
companies and nationals to bribe foreign public officials. First, this section reviews the impact of 
corruption from the perspective of the investor state by considering the impact of corruption on 
political stability. It then considers the impact of corruption on the economic efficiency and 
growth of the recipient state.   
 
i. A Supply Side Economic Argument for Regulating Foreign Corruption 
 
Corruption, through the payment of bribes to public officials, has the effect of distorting markets 
in recipient states.7  These payments not only interfere with competition among corporations 
dealing with governments, but also fortify the position of bureaucratic elites, thereby creating 
barriers to social mobility and misallocating social resources within an established, corrupt 
group.8  Corruption presents a threat to the long-term development of these countries and may 
create economic instability, which ultimately undermines the opportunity and incentive for 
multinational companies to operate in a jurisdiction.9  
 
Given that perspectives on what constitutes objectionable business practices may differ among 
countries and cultures, the decision to criminalize certain practices on an extraterritorial basis 
may, in some respects, be regarded as an arbitrary ethical decision, which limits the freedom of 
corporations operating abroad and places them at a competitive disadvantage relative to domestic 
corporations.10  However, the criminalization of corrupt payments to foreign public officials may 
also be understood from an economic perspective, whereby extraterritorial anti-corruption 
legislation facilitates democratic transitions and opens up new markets for businesses looking to 
expand their operations or distribute their products to new jurisdictions. 
 
Although corruption has been correlated with high short-run growth in certain emerging 
economies such as Indonesia and South Korea, it also has the effect of impeding the 
development of market based economies since decisions are more likely to be based on non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See generally: Susan Rose-Ackerman, “The Political Economy of Corruption” 32 at 32-46 in Kimberly Ann Elloitt, ed., 
Corruption and the Global Economy (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1997).  
7 Brademas & Heimann, supra note 2 at 18. 
8Adit, supra note 2 at 288. 
9 Critics of anti-corruption legislation suggest laws such as the Canadian CFPOA export moral standards which may not be 
common place in other jurisdictions (See generally: Lisa Harriman Randall, “Multilateralization of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act” (1997) 6 Minn J Global Trade 657 at 673.).  These arguments in turn assert that these laws are products of legal positivism, 
which emerged during the Cold War and resurfaced following the collapse of the Soviet Union when the western world 
attempted to introduce democracy and promote the rule of law into the developing world. (Philip M. Nichols, “Are 
Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and Desirable International Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late 
Twentieth Century: Increasing Global Security by Controlling Transnational Bribery” (1998) 20 Mich J Int’l L 451 at 454-459.) 
10 Note that Canadian CFPOA, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at s.3(3)(a) does create a saving provision where 
conduct is permitted under the laws of the foreign state. 
11 Ibid at 463; Brademas & Heimann, supra note 2 at 18; Robert D. Tronnes, “Ensuring Uniformity in the Implementation of the 
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economic factors.11 When rent-seeking behaviour drives decision making, competition is 
stymied, monopolistic behaviour is fostered and perpetuated, and the primacy of the rule of law 
is compromised. Thus, corruption undermines the basic conditions necessary for effective and 
orderly market based competition.12 
 
This disintegration of political and economic institutions occurs because contracts are awarded as 
a result of the bribe rather than superior price or product qualities.  Furthermore, the 
enforceability of agreement between the corrupt government and foreign businesses is also 
diminished because each party has an incentive to conceal the bribe and by extension, the basis 
on which the contract was awarded.  Consequently, there are reduced incentives for the parties to 
the contract to vociferously enforce its terms.13  A second systemic failure emanating from 
corruption is that corruption creates incentives for corrupt public officials to remain in the 
bureaucracy.  Since corruption skews the incentive structure within the bureaucracy there is a 
tendency for non-corrupt civil servants to leave the workforce thereby perpetuating and 
magnifying the prevalence and effects of the corruption.14  Thus, as corruption becomes 
increasingly pervasive, the economic orientation of the impugned country shifts from market-
based to one that supports and facilitates the payment of bribes. 
 
The powerful, short-run incentives that exist for corporations to engage in corrupt business 
practices may give rise to a scenario where the companies benefiting from corruption are 
unlikely to voluntarily forego these windfalls in order to promote the development of a more 
stable economic and political system. The economic incentives to maintain these payments are 
particularly pronounced because if the company providing the bribes ceases to make the 
payments, other competitors are free to capture the market share acquired and maintained 
through the use of these bribes.  Consequently, solutions that regulate the conduct of all 
suppliers, irrespective of jurisdiction, ensure that corporations are not required to cede market-
share to a competitor domiciled in another country if they wish to engage in non-corrupt 
business.   
 
International cooperation to prohibit corrupt practices by businesses operating in foreign markets 
serves an important role in enabling the host jurisdiction to achieve stable, sustainable long-run 
growth.  Through the concept of ‘institutional piggy-backing’, global legal norms, such as the 
prohibition on corruption, can be enforced in jurisdictions other than where the corruption 
occurred while the country’s domestic legal system develops to a the point where it is capable of 
managing enforcement actions on its own.15  Although the prohibition of the corruption of 
foreign public officials can be supported on the grounds that developed nations have an ethical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid at 463; Brademas & Heimann, supra note 2 at 18; Robert D. Tronnes, “Ensuring Uniformity in the Implementation of the 
1997 OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions” (2000) 33 
Geo Wash Int’l L Rev 97 at 103-105. 
12 Eleanor R.E. O’Higgins, “Corruption, Underdevelopment, and Extractive Resource Industries: Addressing the Vicious Circle” 
(2006) 16:2 Business Ethics Quarterly 235 at 238-239.  
13 Nichols, supra note 9 at 464. 
14 Omotunde E.G. Johnson, “An Economic Analysis of Corrupt Government, With Special Application to Less Developed 
Countries” (1975) 28:1 Kyklos 47 at 57. 
15 Kevin E. Davis, “Does the Globalization of Anti-corruption Law Help Developing Countries?” (December 2009) NYU Centre 
for Law, Economics and Organization: Law and Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-52 at 2. 
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imperative to ensure businesses do not engage in conduct abroad that would be illegal if 
transacted in their home jurisdiction, there are also rational economic incentives for countries to 
ensure multinational businesses have access to politically stable environments to transact 
business.16   
 
ii. Impact of Corruption on the Recipient State 
 
All transactions, domestic or international, that require the approval or involvement of 
government create an opportunity and incentive for bribery since such payments, where 
successful, may expedite the transaction or reduce compliance costs.  However, bribes also 
create social externalities when regulations are not properly enforced or the business providing 
the bribe obtain a competitive advantage over their law abiding competition and accrues market 
share that is not referable to price or quality based factors.  Additionally, when corruption is 
pervasive, the demand for bribes by public officials serves as a tax on international commerce, 
which reduces the operational efficiency of businesses.17  
 
Scholars considering corruption in developing economies have debated whether, notwithstanding 
the negative externalities associated with corruption, the payment of bribes results in positive 
sum long-term returns for the host jurisdiction.  Although, scholars such as David Bayley and 
Nathaniel Leff posit that corruption may increase efficiency by ‘greasing the wheels’ in 
transactions where there are weak governmental institutions, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny 
along with Toke Adit demonstrate that such theories focus too narrowly on the effects of 
corruption on a single transaction, to the exclusion of the economy as a whole. Further, Shleifer 
and Vishny argue convincingly that because of the clandestine nature of bribes there is 
insufficient coordination and price transparency that would allow a bribery based system to 
attain the efficiency and economic benefits suggested by Leff and Bayley.  For these reasons, 
bribery not only creates legal and political uncertainty for investors, it can also directly harm the 
efficiency and growth of countries receiving investments tainted by bribes.  Regulatory 
intervention by investor states thus helps to address these long-run, macro-economic 
considerations by incentivizing investors to act in a manner conducive to long-run efficiency and 
growth.  
 
Scholars opposed to foreign corrupt practices legislation have suggested that, in countries with 
weak political and legal institutions, the payment of bribes may help investors overcome 
regulatory impasses and increase allocative efficiency.  In his seminal work, “The Effects of 
Corruption on Developing Nations”, David Bayley attempts to segregate the economic effects of 
corruption from other qualitative assessments of the impact of corruption on the social fabric of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See: Nathaniel H. Leff, “Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption” (1964) 8:3 American Behavioural 
Scientist 8 at 8-9. 
17 Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, “A Coalition of Industrialized Nations, Developing Nations, Multilateral 
Development Banks, and Non-Governmental Organizations: A Pivotal Complement to Current Anti-Corruption Initiatives” 
(2000) 33 Cornell Int’l LJ 547 at 551-53 (Recognizing that the corruption of public officials “can be traced back for centuries 
from several cultures and religions”,  Barbara Crutchfield George and Kathleen Lacey emphasize that the economic linkages 
created by globalization and enhanced global communications have amplified the need for a globalized response to the corruption 
of foreign public officials since there is a strong correlation between increased foreign investment and the opportunities for 
corruption).   
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these countries.18  Of particular note, Bayley emphasizes that not all bribes will necessarily result 
in a public official being corrupted to exercise their authority in an unlawful manner that 
provides favourable treatment to the payor or adversely affects other interests.  Rather, he 
suggests that some bribes may help address political impasses within inefficient political 
systems.19  Bayley also suggests that the externalities created by bribes may actually increase and 
diversify the benefits of the foreign investment by diverting resources to individuals capable of 
reinvesting the funds from the bribe in related industries within the jurisdiction.20  Finally, 
Bayley suggests that the payment of bribes may have the effect of increasing the quality of the 
public service by ensuring that remuneration is sufficient to attract and retain talented 
individuals.21  He ultimately concludes that in developing economies, “corruption is an 
accommodating device” and that analysis of the effects of corruption ought to examine the 
broader impacts on society as a whole as well as its incidental benefits.22   
 
Nathaniel Leff supports the conclusion that corruption may have positive economic effects in 
countries with high levels of red-tape. Leff suggests bribery may expedite bureaucratic services, 
facilitate transactions that would not otherwise take place but for the bribe and cause public 
officials to adopt more favourable views towards activities that promote domestic economic 
growth and allocate their resources to the most economically beneficial ventures.23  He contends 
that opponents of corruption tend to over-estimate the propensity of developing nations to 
allocate taxation income for bona fide development purposes; thus, the grey market created by 
the payment of bribes and lost government revenue has less of a negative impact on development 
than opponents of corruption would otherwise suggest.24  To this end, he asserts that any 
cynicism towards government within society is concentrated among persons who do not have a 
significant impact on the state’s economy. As a result, this corruption may not have a significant 
effect on economic decisions within the country and may actually incentivize innovation outside 
of government imposed channels.25  However, similar to Bayley’s analysis, Leff fails to consider 
how corruption may affect a developing nation’s economy when public officials favour one 
competing bid over another and how it potentially raises the total price of attaining government 
services.   
 
Public choice and legal institutions theorists such as Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny take 
issue with Leff’s conclusion by arguing that corruption tends to have distortionary rather than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 David H. Bayley, “The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation” (1966) 19:4 The Western Political Quarterly 719 at 719-
20. 
19 Ibid at 720, 25 (However, the payment of these bribes will raise the price of government services).  
20 Ibid at 728.  
21 Ibid at 728-30. 
22 Ibid at 730-31.  
23 Leff, supra note 16 at 10-11, 13 (Leff suggests that corruption may reduce antagonism between the bureaucracy, which may be 
hostile towards the wealth and prosperity of foreign investors who may rival government in terms of power and prosperity.  He 
also asserts that corruption may reduce the risk of political uncertainty, instability and bad policy decisions by nascent 
governments, provided there is no overthrow of the existing regime because the close relationship between government and the 
foreign investors may allow these investors to lend their managerial expertise to the government). 
24 Ibid at 12.  
25 Ibid at 13. 
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taxation based economic effects.26  As a starting point for their analysis, they present corruption 
as the sale of a good for which the foreign public official has a monopoly and the discretion to 
arbitrarily restrict the supply with no risk of detection or penalization.27  Shleifer and Vishny 
theorize that although bribes extracted by a single monopolist public official may behave like a 
tax and may not reduce overall consumption (the willingness of corporations to conduct business 
within the jurisdiction), the extortion of multiple, uncoordinated bribes will reduce overall 
consumption because prices do not collectively respond to supply and demand dynamics.28  
Thus, under this model, the economic ill resulting from corruption emanates from the lack of 
transparency and coordination among multiple foreign public officials each of whom is 
independently extracting rents by demanding a bribe.  Shleifer and Vishny conclude that the 
price increase resulting from corruption will have the effect of offsetting any economic benefits 
derived from these rents since the higher prices for goods will reduce demand within the 
jurisdiction.29 
 
Similarly, scholars such as Toke Adit have challenged the robustness of the conclusion that 
bribery may increase efficiency, by assessing the macro relationship between corruption and 
economic development to determine whether corruption increases economic efficiency.30  Adit’s 
analysis goes further than the traditional literature, which analyzes the relationship between 
corruption and gross domestic product per capita, but in his view fails to isolate the marginal 
effect of corruption by discounting production that would occur irrespective of whether the 
investment was facilitated by corrupt practices.  Adit concludes that the effects of corruption are 
weakest in countries with weak governance.31  This provides partial support for the hypothesis 
that corruption may ‘grease the wheels’ for government services.  Such phenomena may also 
suggest that the effects of corruption are less apparent because weak government institutions 
have diminished economic efficiency and thus there are fewer opportunities for corrupt practices 
to negatively affect economic performance.  However, Adit also notes that if this premise is 
correct, it does not support a conclusion that corruption has improved efficiency per se.  Rather, 
in these circumstances, the effects of corruption are less severe because weak governance 
practices provide less opportunity for downside harm.  Adit then concludes that under all 
scenarios, corruption has the effect of reducing macroeconomic efficiency.32  In addition, he 
finds that corruption reduces the overall rate of per capita wealth appreciation (defined as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, “Corruption” (1997) 108:3 Quarterly Journal of Economics 599 at 600 (This model is 
predicated on the foreign public official applying a surcharge to the provision of a government service in a market where the 
foreign public official is unable to effectively price discriminate between corporations from whom he receives the bribe.). 
27 Ibid at 601. 
28 Ibid at 607-611 (Multiple licenses and other government approvals  are conceptualized as complementary goods such that the 
failure to coordinate bribes among multiple independent foreign public officials who provide the goods will reduce total demand, 
defined as access to the market.  Consequently, a failure to take into account the demand complementarities among these licenses 
will lower consumption than that which would exist with a single monopolist.  As a result, the failure to regulate corruption will 
result in the uncoordinated extortion of bribes for complementary licenses and approvals will reduce overall demand). 
29 Ibid at 613. This theory fails to account for bribes extracted in relation to the production of goods for export.  Under such a 
model, and assuming the producer is incapable of shifting the location of production, the rents accrued as a result of the bribe will 
be retained in the jurisdiction where the bribe is extracted and the deadweight loss will accrue in the jurisdiction where the 
finished good is purchased or the profits are realized.  
30 Adit, supra note 2 at 277.  
31 Ibid at 282. 
32 Ibid at 284. 
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rate of foreign investment in capital assets less the consumption of these assets), which is lower 
in jurisdictions with high levels of corruption, when other factors such as initial income, 
education, geography and political and legal institutions are controlled for.33 
 
Although the payment of bribes may facilitate greater economic efficiency in discrete 
transactions and assist businesses in overcoming bureaucratic barriers,, in aggregate bribery 
ultimately destabilizes the investment climate and hinders long-term growth.  International 
regulation thus assists in reducing the incentives for businesses to engage in corrupt practices and 
provides the stop-gap infrastructure necessary for foreign jurisdictions to develop the legal 
regimes required to grow in a sustainable manner.   
 
However, as discussed in subsequent sections, the extraterritorial regulation of corporate conduct 
presents significant enforcement and compliance challenges since attitudes towards corruption 
differ substantially around the world as do the incentives facing the individuals who solicit and 
provide bribes.  
 
b. Regulating Corruption – Enforcement Effectiveness Challenges 
	  
	  
Though the regulation of corporate conduct abroad promotes political stability, legal certainty, 
and long-term economic growth in foreign jurisdictions, the extraterritorial nature of the 
prohibited conduct creates unique enforcement challenges. While a company’s home jurisdiction 
may impose harsh penalties for the payment of bribes, the countries in which it operates may do 
little to discourage bribes or even actively seek them. This asymmetrical treatment of the same 
underlying conduct results in transactional inequality and differing incentives as between the 
providers and recipients of bribes. A clearer understanding of the challenges and limitations 
associated with regulating the corruption of foreign public officials provides a foundation for 
reform of the Canadian anti-corruption regime. An understanding these challenges will allow 
reform be made in a manner that addresses both the opportunities for Canadian businesses to 
engage in bribery and the incentives that make the decision to do so rational.     
 
The Canadian CFPOA defines a bribe as giving or offering to give any “loan, reward, advantage 
or benefit of any kind to a foreign public official or to any person for the benefit of a foreign 
public official”.34  Corruption, under the Criminal Code and Canadian CFPOA, arise when a 
bribe is given to a domestic or foreign public official, in order to obtain an advantage in the 
course of business and this bribe is given as consideration for an act or omission by such an 
official in connection with his or her official duties or the exercise of influence in a decision 
making process.35   
 
Though the underlying act of corruption is identical in both domestic and international fora, the 
extraterritorial nature of the corruption of foreign public officials presents significant regulatory 
and corporate governance challenges.  In particular, unlike domestic corruption legislation where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Ibid at 285-86.  
34 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss.121, 123; Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c.34, s.3. 
35 Criminal Code, ibid ss.121, 123; Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, ibid s.3. 
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the individual providing the bribe and the public official who was the intended beneficiary can 
both be prosecuted under the Criminal Code, Canada only has jurisdiction to prosecute a limited 
range of persons under the Canadian CFPOA, namely those persons who are either present 
within Canada or individuals who are Canadian citizens.36  As a result, the prosecution of the 
foreign public official receiving the bribe and any employees or agents who are neither Canadian 
residents nor citizens are the exclusive purview of the state in which the act of bribery occurred.  
However, because regulatory capacity and attitudes towards corruption vary markedly 
throughout the world,37 there can be no assurances that these persons will face prosecution in 
their home jurisdiction or that there is domestic legislation that criminalizes the impugned 
conduct.38  
 
As individuals engaged in a corrupt transaction may be governed by different legislation, the 
incentives and consequences associated with bribery may not be consistent for all parties.  This 
disjointed approach to the enforcement and prosecution of corruption creates significant 
challenges from a regulatory theory and corporate governance perspective when compared to 
domestic corruption legislation, which targets all sides of a transaction in an even-handed 
manner. Due to the absence of effective deterrents in many jurisdictions where corruption is 
occurs, this patchwork regulatory model to relies heavily on supply-side pressures to discourage 
companies and their employees and agents from providing bribes. Yet the clandestine nature and 
extraterritorial setting of corrupt business practices make them notoriously difficult for domestic 
law enforcement to detect.39 
 
c. Regulating the Supply Side of Corrupt Transactions 
 
Effective supply-side regulation requires a variety of regulatory tools, which promote 
compliance and utilize progressive discipline to ensure responsivity to a broad range of conduct 
and provide incentives for corporations to develop appropriate internal controls.  However, the 
regulatory capacity of the Canadian CFPOA is limited because it relies exclusively on criminal 
law as its sole regulatory instrument.  As a result, the costs associated with ensuring compliance 
with the Canadian CFPOA are placed squarely on government rather than market participants 
whose employees may face incentives to engage in corrupt practices abroad.  
 
The regulation of corrupt practices presents challenges from behaviour modification, risk 
mitigation and enforcement perspectives, as it requires countries to influence behaviour 
occurring beyond their borders.  Regulatory theory provides a number of possible solutions to 
this challenge. Effective regulatory theory posits that enforcement intensity and resources should 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 In particular, the Ontario Superior Court’s recent decision in Chowdhury v. Canada, 2014 ONSC 2635 clarified that the 
Canadian CFPOA does not extend Canada’s jurisdiction over foreign corruption to include foreign nationals who are not 
residents of Canada and do not have a connection to Canada.36  See infra, notes 146 to Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
37 James Lloyd Bierstaker, “Differences in attitude about fraud and corruption across cultures: Theory, examples and 
recommendations” (2009) 16:3 Cross Cultural Management 241 at 246. 
38 See generally: The Criminalisation of Bribery in Asia and the Pacific: Frameworks and Practices in 28 Asian and Pacific 
jurisdictions Thematic Review – Final Report (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011) at 11-15, 
26, 55-57. 
39 Nicholas Lord, “Responding to transnational corporate bribery using international frameworks for enforcement: Anti-bribery 
and corruption in the UK and Germany” (2014) 14:1 Criminology & Criminal Justice 100  at 106.  
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be structured in a manner that incentivizes proactive compliance and deterrence.40 In their 
seminal work, Responsive Regulation, Ian Ayers and John Braithwaite observe that the most 
effective regulatory regimes devote substantial resources towards compliance and progressive 
discipline and reserve criminal law sanctions for the most egregious offences.41  This approach 
emphasizes the need for a solid foundation, which encourages law abiding conduct by addressing 
the systemic factors giving rise to the corruption rather than focusing on the most high-profile 
and visible conduct.42 It also balances enforcement costs between corporations and the 
government by shifting a portion of the regulatory compliance costs onto market participants.  
 
Recent developments in regulatory theory have attempted to apply Ayers and Braithwaite’s 
theory of responsive regulation in a transnational context. For instance, Kenneth Abbott and 
Duncan Snidal explore the ability of intergovernmental organizations (“IGOs”) to act as 
responsive regulators.43 Though IGOs like the UN and the OECD continue to play an important 
role in coordinating the international development of legislation on bribery of foreign public 
officials, due to the lack of effective international enforcement mechanisms, the applicability of 
Ayres and Braithwaite’s theory at the present time is largely restricted to state regulation. The 
resulting reliance on state-based enforcement mechanisms to address the corruption of foreign 
public officials results in significant international pressure for signatory states to improve 
national legislation to address transnational corruption.44  
 
Scholars such as Marie-Laure Djelic and Sigrid Quack have suggested that classic 
institutionalism and domestic regulation have adopted an “agnostic stance” of classic 
institutionalism towards transnational solutions.45  Although transnationalist theories of 
incorporating both state and non-state actors into a broader regulatory approach may well be 
capable of providing greater synergies and pragmatic solutions for addressing governance and 
behavioural challenges,46 such theories tend to downplay the utility and capacity of domestic 
regimes to address the ills of foreign corrupt practices until such time as a comprehensive set of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Poonam Puri, “Securities Litigation and Enforcement: The Canadian Perspective” (2012) 37 Brook J Int’l L 967 at 980. 
41 Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992) 35-40. 
42 John Braithwaite, “The Essence of Responsive Regulation” (2011) 44 UBC L Rev 480-483. 
43 See generally: Kenneth W. Abbot & Duncan Snidal, “Taking responsive regulation Transnational: Strategies for international 
organizations” (2013) 7(1) Regulation & Governance 95; Peter Grabosky “Beyond Responsive Regulation: The expanding role 
of non-state actors in the regulatory process” (2013) 7(1) 114. 
44 Lord, supra note 39, at 104; Patrick Delaney, “Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across Borders” (2015) 47:2 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 413 at 430.  
45 Marie-Laure Djelic and Sigrid Quack, “Institutions and Transnationalization” in  Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Roy 
Suddaby, Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson eds., The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (London: Sage Publications, 
2008) 299 at 300-301 (Arguing that economic and social activity are increasingly being shaped by transnational forces and 
institutions that are not reconcilable with traditional concepts of nation state power). 
46 See generally: Johnathan Zeitlin, “Pragmatic transnationalism: governance across borders in the global economy” (2011) 9(1) 
Socio-Economic Rev. 187; at 5; Marie-Laure Djelic & Kersten Sahlin-Andersson “Introduction: A world of governance: The rise 
of transnational regulation” in Marie-Laure Djelic & Kersten Sahlin-Andersson eds., Transnational Governance: Institutional 
Dynamics of Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 4-6 (asserting that transnationalism “does not imply 
the disappearance of nation states [rather they] are only one type of actor amongst others”  as such, Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 
suggest that a transnational perspective is more capable of understanding activities that take place within multiple jurisdictions.) 
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transnational institutions take hold.47  To this end, this paper proposes measures grounded in 
Canadian domestic law that have the capacity to have a short- to medium-term impact on the 
behaviour of market participants giving rise to corruption. This approach is; however, not 
intended to present transnational and domestic regulatory solutions as a binomial dichotomy, 
rather, it is suggested that both regimes serve an important role on the temporal path from 
identifying the issue requiring regulation to developing solutions to collectively address such 
problems on a global scale.  To this end, transnational governance need not be regarded as filling 
a regulatory void that exists at the domestic level,48 rather scholars such as Tim Bartley suggest 
that transnationalism provides a complementary layer of regulation designed to supplement 
existing domestic legislation.49 Framed in this way, international conventions, monitoring by 
IGOs like Transparency International, and the internal initiatives of multinational corporations 
themselves should be understood to work concert with an equally important layer of national 
regulation.50 
 
Although theoretical models of transnational regulation espouse numerous regulatory advantages 
when compared to more traditional forms of domestic regulation, state actors and, by extension, 
domestic regulatory regimes remain a central regulatory actor at the present time. As such, 
analysis of existing domestic regulatory regimes and instruments available to domestic actors 
remains highly relevant to an analysis of the regulation of foreign corrupt practices by Canadian 
corporations. In our view, when applied to an anti-corruption regulatory regime, Ayers and 
Braithwaite’s model underscore the need for legislative frameworks that encourage businesses to 
proactively develop internal controls that to mitigate the risk of corruption by employees or 
agents and impose a wide range of accountabilities.   
 
We believe that the use of securities disclosure requirements and corporate law duties to 
encourage corporations to develop, implement, and disclose internal policies and controls will 
compliment transnational approaches. Making use of these soft law mechanisms familiar to 
domestic governments, regulators, and judges which have been effective for modifying 
behaviour in other contexts, will round out the Canadian approach to foreign corrupt practices by 
ensuring that corruption prevention is a priority at every level, from the individual to the 
international. Corporate governance norms thus play a critical role in supporting the international 
reach of domestic regulatory structures and legal standards.51 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See generally: Tim Bartley, “Transnational Governance as the Layering of Rules: Intersections of Public and Private 
Standards” (2011) 12(2) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 517 (Argues that transnational solutions too frequently search for a macro 
solution to a particular regulatory problem and fail to account for the implementation of such standards, which are more naturally 
within the purview of domestic regulatory actors).  
48 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance” (2011) 54 Int. Org. 421 (Suggests that 
transnational regulation is an alternative to the costs and enforcement difficulties associated with a patchwork system of domestic 
regulation). 
49 Bradley supra note 47 at 519; see also: Tim Bradley, “Transnational governance and the re-centered state: Sustainability or 
legality?” (2014) 8(1) Regulation & Governance 93; Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur, “Regional Integration and Transnational 
Regulatory Regimes” in Laszlo Bruszt, Gerald A. McDermott eds., Leveling the Playing Field: Transnational Regulatory 
Integration and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 175 (suggests that governance and transnational 
regulatory models as one of many spheres of regulatory authority, which includes nation states and other domestic regulatory 
regimes).  
50 Delaney, supra note 44 at  416.  
51 Jannis Sarra “Convergence Versus Divergence: Global Corporate Governance at the Crossroads” (2001) 33 Ottawa L Rev 177 
at 186-87.  
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Similarly, effective communication from government regulators on what constitutes offending 
conduct, as well as the steps that businesses can take to reduce their potential liability, provides 
the necessary foundation for law enforcement officials to address instances of hard core 
corruption and impose more stringent sentences on the most egregious offenders.  The 
development of a healthy dialogue with government regulators and transparency on the part of 
market participants will in turn lend support to the investigative efforts of law enforcement as it 
assists in compiling intelligence regarding business practices, jurisdictions and industries that 
pose the greatest risk for corrupt transactions.  For these reasons, the authors are of the opinion 
that any regulatory regime designed to address both the institutional causes and individual 
incentives which lead to bribery must adopt a multifaceted strategy which facilitates dialogue 
between regulators and businesses and proactively promote compliance, while retaining the 
sanctions necessary to aggressively prosecute corruption. Regimes that focuses exclusively on 
the most punitive criminal law sanctions miss opportunities for behaviour modification and 
disregard strategies for garnering industry buy in on the fight against foreign corrupt practices.  
 
d. Investor State Regulation of Foreign Corrupt Practices  
 
Although there has been widespread recognition of the economic and social problems created by 
corruption for some time, a cohesive international response to the issue has been slow in coming.  
For many years, governments around the world ignored the issue and in many instances allowed 
corporations to treat payments made to foreign public officials as tax-deductible business 
expenses.52  This section explores the development of international agreements on foreign 
corrupt practices and underscores the need for Canadian policymakers to implement international 
best practices to ensure that the incentives for businesses to engage in foreign bribery do not 
differ depending on the home jurisdiction of a business or individual. 
 
i. Historical Overview – Moving Towards a Global Response to the Corruption of 
Foreign Public Officials  
 
In response to corruption scandals involving American companies in the developing world and 
revelations of the prevalence of corrupt business practices following the Watergate scandal, the 
United States enacted the U.S. FCPA in 1977.53  Supported by the United States’ Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the U.S. FCPA introduced new disclosure requirements for 
publicly listed companies.  These disclosure standards require management to account for 
payments made to foreign public officials as part of their continuous disclosure obligations, 
irrespective of whether these payments were material from a securities law standpoint.54  Despite 
objections from the accounting profession, Congress agreed with the SEC’s argument that “to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Brademas & Heimann, supra note 2 at 17.  
53 Peter M. German, “To Bribe or Not to Bribe – A Less than Ethical Dilemma, Resolved?” (2002) 9:3 J of Fin Crime 249 at 249; 
Hurd Baruch, “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (1979) 57:1 Hav Bus Rev 32 at 33. 
54 Baruch, ibid at 33 (‘Materiality’ was defined to be any financially important economic information, which could influence the 
value of the investment or the securityholder’s voting decision.  However, since the 1964 decision In re Franchard Corp. the 
SEC had advocated that the integrity of management is always material. Thus, the SEC argues that management should be 
obligated to disclose the character and existence of any payments made to public officials since corrupt payments were relevant 
to securityholders’ assessment of the integrity of management). 
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require a lesser standard in defining the obligation to keep books and records could lead to the 
argument that falsifications or omissions below a certain amount may be tolerated”.55   
 
This disclosure requirement complements other provisions of the act that require businesses to 
develop accounting systems that ensure all transactions undertaken by the business are 
authorized by its management.56  The legislation also attempts to “cut off the supply of bribes 
flowing from American businesses to corrupt foreign officials.”57  The original U.S. FCPA 
operated as a predominately regulatory statute designed to increase transparency on the character 
of payments, shed light on previously undisclosed accounts used to facilitate these payments and 
incentivize issuers to develop internal controls to address corrupt payments provided by their 
employees or agents.58 
 
Despite pressure from the United States, other nations refused to follow its lead in developing 
anti-corruption legislation.  This inconsistent treatment of bribery distorted the market for 
international commerce and investment, and underscored the need for a comprehensive 
international response by the home jurisdictions of most multinational corporations.59  Moreover, 
many host jurisdictions were either unwilling or unable to develop and enforce anti-bribery 
legislation.60  Although the United States Department of Justice recognized that “[c]ompliance 
with the new Act may not be costless for the United States […] living up to one’s principles 
rarely is.”61 American corporations were less optimistic, arguing that the inconsistent regulatory 
framework placed them at a competitive disadvantage relative to their international peers.62  This 
early American experience, illustrated that a consistent regulatory framework of either regulating 
or not regulating corruption within the home jurisdiction of multinational corporations was 
required to ensure fair treatment irrespective of their jurisdiction of operation.  
 
In 1996 the Organization of American States adopted the “Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption”, modeled upon the U.S. FCPA.63  This convention focused on developing systems 
within the signatory states to monitor the conduct of their public officials and register the 
“income, assets and liabilities of persons who perform public functions” and may be targeted for 
corrupt payments.64  The convention also committed signatories to developing legislation to 
prohibit and punish persons found to have engaged in transnational bribery.65   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Ibid at 33.  
56 Ibid at 38. 
57 Harriman Randall, supra note 9 at 664. 
58 Ibid at 659-663. 
59 Ibid at 18.  
60 Amy Deen Westbrook, “Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act” (2011) 45:2 Ga L Rev 489 at 514. 
61 Ibid at 676 quoting Philip B. Heymann, “Justice Outlines Priorities in Prosecuting Violations of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” 
(November 21, 1979) Am Banker at 4, 10. 
62 Stanley Sporkin, “The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on its Twentieth 
Birthday” (1998) 18 NW J Int’l L & Bus 269 at 276. 
63 Steven R. Salbu, “Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (1997) 54 Wash & 
Lee L Rev 229 at 234. 
64 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (March 29, 1996), Article III, Article VII.  
65 Ibid, Article VIII.  
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Following the adoption of the convention, the OECD, in 1997, developed the “Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.” After 
Canada’s ratification of the treaty in December 1998, the convention was adopted and entered 
into force.66  This treaty commits member states to adopt legislation prohibiting the bribery of 
foreign public officials and encourage cooperation with foreign governments in the investigation 
of corruption. In 2003, the United Nations adopted the “Convention Against Corruption”.67  This 
convention built upon prior international agreements and criminalized a broader range of 
activities beyond purely monetary payments including trading in influence.68  Although these 
treaties demonstrate increased international support for the fight against bribery and corruption, 
their capacity and effect is largely contingent on uniformity of implementation and enforcement 
within the signatory states.69  
 
Building upon these foundational documents, the OECD released a series of recommendations 
and best practices for combating foreign corruption in 2009.70  These recommendations 
predominately focused on removing indirect supports within the tax and international 
development assistance systems which may facilitate bribery.71  Secondly, they highlighted the 
need for increased reporting and record keeping by financial institutions facilitating international 
transactions and heightened scrutiny from accountants and auditors who review the financial 
disclosure of these businesses.72  A final aspect of these recommendations was the development 
of civil, commercial and administrative law regulations to combat foreign bribery.  As will be 
discussed in greater detail, Canada’s failure to develop such regulations is considered a critical 
shortcoming of Canada’s foreign corruption regime.73 
 
With an international regulatory infrastructure in place, the United Nations and OECD have, in 
recent years, focused their efforts on ensuring signatory jurisdictions develop adequate 
legislation and enforcement regimes through the publication of country monitoring reports.74  
These reports provide enhanced transparency on anti-corruption legislative and regulatory 
frameworks around the world and facilitate the independent review of the statutes and 
enforcement efforts.  Through this oversight, the OECD promotes greater consistency and an 
international cooperation in the fight against foreign corrupt practices.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Tronnes, supra note 11 at 98. 
67 United Nations, “Convention Against Corruption” (October 31, 2003) Resolution 58/4. 
68 Ibid at Articles 14, 18, 23.  
69 Ibid at 99; Gerasimova Ksenia, “Can Corruption and economic crime be controlled in developing countries and if so, is it cost 
effective” (2008) 15:2 J Fin Crime 223 at 225. 
70 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions” (November26, 2009), online: <http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/44176910.pdf>.  
71 Ibid at III(iii), (vii). 
72 Ibid at III(v), (vi). 
73 Ibid at III(viii). 
74 See generally: “Country reports on the implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention” Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, online: http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/countryreportsontheimplementationoftheoecdanti-
briberyconvention.htm. 
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ii. Canadian Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act 
 
Pursuant to Canada’s international obligations under the OECD’s “Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Trade”, the Canadian CFPOA was enacted in 
1997.75  This act has the effect of extending many aspects of Canada’s criminal prohibitions on 
corruption to include the conduct of individuals and corporations operating in foreign 
jurisdictions. In response to international recommendations, the Canadian CFPOA was amended 
in 2013 to enhance Canada’s ability to prosecute a wider range of activities and impose more 
stringent sentences.  However, the Canadian CFPOA has failed to evolve beyond a criminal law 
statute to assume a more multifaceted regulatory role.  
 
Under the Criminal Code, individuals and corporations are prohibited from providing bribes to 
Canadian public officials.  These offences are divided into four categories: (i) bribery of officers, 
(ii) frauds on the government, (iii) bribery of judicial officers and (iv) municipal corruption.76  
Bribery of officers has the broadest scope and applies when anyone corruptly gives or offers to 
give “any money, valuable consideration, office, place or employment” with the intent of 
affecting an officer’s ability or willingness to discharge his or her duties.  By contrast, fraud on 
the government applies only when anyone “gives, offers or agrees to give [any]… loan, reward, 
advantage or benefit of any kind as consideration” for the public official’s cooperation with 
respect to a transaction or “matter relating to the business of the government”.77  The provision 
also extends to payments made to any employee or public official with respect to the individual’s 
dealings with the public official.  When a corrupt transaction occurs, the government may 
prosecute both the individual who provided the bribe as well as the public official who accepted 
it.  In this respect, the legal jeopardy and deterrent effect is similar for both the payor and public 
official.  
 
The Canadian CFPOA attempts to mirror the aforementioned provisions of the Criminal Code by 
using the term any “foreign public official”.  Foreign public official is broadly defined to include 
individuals falling under any of the four categories of officials captured under the Criminal Code 
and also includes members of a public international organization.78  The scope of the offenses 
apply to any payment made as “consideration for an act or omission by the official” or “to induce 
the official to use his or her position to influence any acts or decisions” of the foreign state or 
public international organization.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 An Act respecting the corruption of foreign public officials and the implementation of the Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, and to make related amendments to other Acts, SC 1998 c.34. 
76 Criminal Code, supra note 34 ss.119 (bribery of judicial officers), 120 (bribery of officers), 121 (frauds on the government), 
123 (municipal corruption).  
77 Ibid at s.121 (an offense may be established irrespective of whether or not the official is able to “cooperate, render assistance, 
exercise influence or do or omit to do what is proposed). 
78 Ibid at s.120 (Unlike the Criminal Code, s.121(2), which applies to payments made to a candidate for election or political party 
for the purposes of retaining a government contract the COFPA does not extend to payments made to candidates or political 
parties who do not subsequently enter public office). 
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In 2011, the OECD Working Group on Bribery released a critical report on the Canadian 
CFPOA and Canada’s conservative response to international corruption.79  It recommended the 
act be amended to apply to both for-profit and non-profit entities, limit the ability of companies 
convicted of a Canadian CFPOA offense to contract with government and that Canada take 
additional steps to sanction corporations which use off balance sheet accounts to conceal corrupt 
practices.80  In response to this and other international reports, the Canadian CFPOA was 
amended in 2013 by removing the requirement that businesses operate on a “for profit basis”, 
increasing the maximum jail term under the act from five to fourteen years, criminalizing the 
falsification of the books and records of a corporation to conceal corrupt activity, eliminating the 
requirement that there be a nexus between Canada and the alleged offense before charges can be 
laid against Canadian citizens, permanent residents or businesses and specifically empowering 
the RCMP to lay charges under the Act.81  These changes strengthen the Canadian CFPOA by 
clarifying the scope of the provisions and clearly establishing the RCMP’s authority over the 
investigation of corruption.   
 
A unique aspect of the Canadian CFPOA, when compared to domestic bribery and corruption 
legislation, is that it expressly extends the criminal prohibitions to include the establishment or 
maintenance of an account, which does not appear in the books of the corporation, for the 
purposes of bribing a foreign public official or where a person takes steps to conceal fraudulent 
transactions such as not recording the payment or falsifying book entries.82  These amendments 
to the Canadian CFPOA mirror the SEC’s original approach to regulating corruption through 
enhanced disclosure requirements designed to force businesses to disclose the existence and 
character of all payments made.  More importantly, the Canadian CFPOA’s accounting 
provisions extend liability for corrupt payments to all individuals within a corporation who 
facilitate or conceal payments made by others and, in doing so, promotes greater accountability.  
 
However, the changes stopped short of moving the Canadian CFPOA from a purely criminal law 
instrument to a more comprehensive regulatory regime, which would have created incentives for 
businesses to internally address and minimize the risk of corruption by their employees or 
agents.  Recognizing the difficulties associated with discovering corrupt business practices, 
particularly in foreign jurisdictions where bribery may be more culturally acceptable or the 
capacity of governmental and non-governmental organizations to investigate corruption may be 
limited, it may be necessary to proactively target business practices which have the effect of 
condoning corruption or allowing senior officials to remain willfully blind to corrupt practices 
abroad.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Working Group on Bribery “Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Canada” (March 18, 
2011) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, online: 
<http://www.oecd.org/canada/Canadaphase3reportEN.pdf>. 
80 Robin MacKay, “Legislative Summary of Bill S-14: An Act to amend the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act” 
(February 28, 2013) Library of Parliament Research Publications, online: Parliament of Canada 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/LegislativeSummaries/bills_ls.asp?ls=s14&Parl=41&Ses=1> at 1.3 
81 Ibid at 2. 
82 Canadian CFPOA, supra note 34 s.4. 
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Research suggests that compliance and behaviour modification is best achieved when regulators 
have recourse to a variety of regulatory instruments and enforcement mechanisms.83  Given that 
the resources of large corporations to defend against criminal allegations often closely match or 
even exceed those of government, the investigation and criminal prosecution of corporate 
conduct may be extremely difficult and expensive.84  Developing a broader range of regulatory 
instruments would provide a measure of flexibility and cost efficiency for the regulation of 
foreign corrupt practices.  In particular, incorporating a range of civil offenses into the anti-
corruption regime would help respond to the evidentiary difficulties associated with prosecuting 
offenses where a large portion of the conduct occurred in a foreign jurisdiction and provide a 
degree of progressivity and to help incentivize compliance and development of robust anti-
corruption programs within corporations.  For instance, imposing more stringent book and record 
keeping standards on businesses operating in foreign jurisdictions would reduce the opportunities 
and temptation for employees or agents to engage in corrupt conduct.  Moreover, such 
approaches enable regulators to intervene in a wider range of corporate conduct and create 
incentives for corporations to develop more comprehensive controls.   
 
e. A Comparison of Canadian, American & British Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Legislation 
 
The enforcement effectiveness of the Canadian CFPOA can be evaluated by reference to the U.S. 
FCPA and U.K. Bribery Act.  Given the maturity of American foreign corruption legislation, 
which was first enacted in 1977, the enforcement infrastructure and regulatory framework in the 
United States can serve as a basis for evaluating the development of Canada’s regime. Similarly, 
the U.K. Bribery Act, which was enacted in 2010 to criminalize the bribery of foreign public 
officials and hold corporations responsible for the conduct of their employees or agents who 
engage in foreign corrupt practices, is also an example of a more contemporary regulatory 
structure.85  By evaluating and comparing these three pieces of legislation, we highlight their 
respective strengths and shortcomings and provide recommendations for the development of 
comprehensive foreign corrupt practices legislation in the Canadian context.  
 
Comparison of Anti-Corruption Legislation and Enforcement Structures 
 Canada United States United Kingdom 
Date Enacted 1998 1977 2010 
Investigative 
Authority 
Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police – International Anti-
Corruption Unit 
Department of Justice & SEC Ministry of Justice – Serious 
Fraud Office  
Regulated Entity Persons Issuers of securities and 
domestic concerns and officers, 
directors, employees or agents 
thereof 
Persons 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 See generally: John Braithwaite & T. Makkai, “Trust and Compliance” (1994) 4:1 Policing and Society 1; Brent Fisse & John 
Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Malcolm Sparrow, The 
Regulatory Craft (Brookings Institute Press, 2000). 
84 Poonam Puri, Enforcement Effectiveness in Canadian Capital Markets (Toronto: Capital Markets Institute, 2005) at 9-10. 
85U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 5 ss.6-7.  
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Maximum 
Sentences for Acts 
of Bribery 
14 years imprisonment and a 
fine 
5 years imprisonment and a fine 
of $250,000 for individuals or 
$2 million for corporations or 
twice the financial gain or loss 
avoided as a result of the 
corrupt payment for both 
individuals and corporations 
10 years imprisonment and a 
fine 
Guidance 
Documents and 
Regulations 
None Advisory opinions from the 
Attorney General may be 
obtained by issuers and 
domestic concerns as to 
whether prospective conduct 
complies with current 
enforcement policies86 
The Secretary of State is 
statutorily required to produce 
public guidance documents to 
stipulate procedures that 
corporations can put in place to 
mitigate potential vicarious 
liability under the act87 
Books & Records 
Provision 
“Every person commits an 
offence who, for the purposes 
of bribing a foreign official in 
order to obtain or retain an 
advantage in the course of 
business or for the purposes of 
hiding that bribery” establishes 
or maintains accounts or makes 
transactions that are not 
presented in the books of the 
company or falsifies the books 
in this respect88 
Reporting issuers are required 
to maintain books that “detail, 
accurately and fairly reflect the 
transactions and dispositions of 
the issuer”89 and “devise and 
maintain a system of internal 
accounting controls sufficient to 
provide reasonable assurances 
that” transactions are authorized 
by management and recorded as 
necessary to permit the 
preparation of financial 
statements90  
Under the Companies Act, it is 
an offence to fail to keep 
accounting records that are 
sufficient to show and explain 
the company’s transactions and 
disclose the company’s 
financial position at any point 
in time91 
Vicarious Liability 
of Management for 
Transactions 
No Yes – Management may be 
liable for failing to maintain a 
system of adequate internal 
accounting controls 
Yes – Corporations are guilty of 
an offence if a person 
associated with the corporation 
bribes another person in 
violation of the act.  However, 
the presence of adequate 
procedures designed to prevent 
associated persons from 
undertaking such conduct is a 
defence to liability92 
Applicable to 
Facilitating 
Payments 
Legal Inconsistent Treatment – The 
SEC and United States 
Department of Justice have 
adopted a narrow interpretation 
of what constitutes facilitating 
payments when pursuing 
settlement agreements.  
However, courts have 
interpreted the provision more 
broadly93 
Illegal94 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 28 C.F.R. §§80.1-80.16 (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedures). 
87 U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 5 ss.9.  
88 Canadian CFPOA, supra note 34 s.4 
89 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(A). 
90 14 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(B). 
91 Companies Act, 2006, c.46 (U.K.)ss.386-87. 
92 U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 5 s.7.  
93 Kevin J. Harnisch, Steven M. Witzel & Joshua D. Roth. “United States: The Disappearing Exception For Facilitating 
Payments: Agencies Take Narrow View Of This FCPA Defense” (February 27, 2013), Mondaq, online: < 
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http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/224072/White+Collar+Crime+Fraud/The+Disappearing+Exception+For+Facilitating+Pa
yments+Agencies+Take+Narrow+View+Of+This+FCPA+Defense>. 
94 Department of Justice, “The Bribery Act 2012: Guidance about procedures which relevant commercial organizations can put 
into place to prevent persons associated with them from bribing” (March 2011), online: 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf> at para. 26 (Hospitality and promotional 
expenses which seek to improve the image of an organization or establish cordial relations are not prosecuted under the Act). 
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i. United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
 
Due in part to the maturity of its foreign corrupt practices legislation and size of its economy, the 
United States has more developed foreign corrupt practices enforcement than other jurisdictions.  
In this respect, the United States legislation can be characterized as more robust than its’ 
Canadian counterpart in terms of the scope of prohibited conduct and punishments.  Foreign 
corruption charges in the United States often arise through the acquisition of a company that 
previously engaged in corrupt practices, the conduct of foreign subsidiaries whose management 
is less cognizant of western standards, or the conduct of rogue employees.95  In this respect, 
enforcement in the United States targets misconduct perpetrated by a broader range of 
individuals than recent Canadian jurisprudence.   
 
Similar to the Canadian CFPOA, the U.S. FCPA applies to both foreign nationals within the 
United States and American nationals and corporations engaged in business abroad.96  However, 
the United States legislation arguably uses broader language in its offence provisions by stating 
that bribes can include “anything of value”.97  ‘Anything of value’ has been broadly interpreted 
by both the United States Department of Justice and SEC and includes monetary benefits, gifts, 
favours and charitable donations provided to charitable organizations with whom the foreign 
public official has a close relationship.98  In addition, the United States legislation applies to 
payments made for a broader range of purposes.  The Canadian CFPOA requires that the bribe 
be in the form of a “loan, reward, advantage or benefit of any kind”99  and is limited to payments 
made “in order to obtain or retain an advantage in the course of business”.100 By contrast, the 
U.S. FCPA creates four types of prohibited payments, namely influencing an act or decision of a 
foreign public official, inducing an official to do or omit to do any act in violation of his or her 
duties, payments made for the purposes of securing an improper advantage and payments made 
to induce the foreign public official to use his or her influence to affect or influence a 
government decision.101 
 
The U.S. FCPA also employs a narrower definition of “foreign official” than the Canadian 
CFPOA.  The U.S. FCPA limits the definition of “foreign official” to officers or employees of a 
“foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof”.102  However, 
subsequent United States jurisprudence has broadly interpreted “instrumentality” to include “an 
entity controlled by the government of a foreign country that performs a function the controlling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Margaret Ryznar & Samer Korkor, “Anti-Bribery Legislation in the United States and United Kingdom: A Comparative 
Analysis of Scope and Sentencing” (2011) 76 Mo L Rev 415 at 417-18. 
96 15 U.S.C. §§78dd-1-78-3; Chowdhury v. Canada, supra note 3. 
97 15 U.S.C. §78dd1-1(a)(1)(B). 
98 Ryznar & Korkor, supra note 95 at 426-27 (In the SEC’s 2004 enforcement action against Schering-Plough Corporation, it was 
held that it was not necessary for the impugned foreign public official to receive a direct benefit from the bribe.  Rather it is 
sufficient that the benefit be intangible and enhance the reputation or prestige of the recipient). 
99 Canadian CFPOA, supra note 34 s.3(1).  
100 Canadian CFPOA, supra note 34 s.3(1). 
101 15 U.S.C. §78dd1-1(a)(1). 
102 15 U.S.C. §78dd-1(f)(1)(A). 
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government treats as its own”.103  By contrast, the Canadian CFPOA defines foreign public 
official to include “any person who performs public duties or functions of a foreign state”.104  
Canadian legislation thus empowers the court to determine whether the person performs a public 
function without inquiring as to how the foreign government classifies the person.  Moreover, 
public duty appears to extend to a broader range of entities than just those controlled by a 
government of a foreign country.  
 
Similar to the Canadian legislation, the U.S. FCPA also contains a books and records provision, 
which criminalizes taking steps to conceal bribes.  The United States legislation imposes a 
positive obligation on public reporting issuers to “make and keep books, records and accounts 
that, in reasonable detail accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the 
assets of the issuer.”105  Issuers are further required to  
 
“devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable 
assurances that – transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific 
operation; transactions are recorded as necessary […] to maintain accountability for assets; access to 
assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; and the 
recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and 
appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences”.106 
 
Consequently, an issuer’s management is required to keep accurate transaction records and is 
criminally liable for their willful failure to develop a set of controls designed to prevent 
corruption.107  By contrast, the Canadian CFPOA only criminalizes instances where individuals 
deliberately falsify the books and records of an organization or falsify or destroys documents, 
books or records for the purposes of “bribing a foreign public official in order to obtain or retain 
an advantage in the course of business or for the purpose of hiding that bribery”.108  Thus, under 
the Canadian CFPOA there are no positive obligations on management to establish controls that 
address the risk of members of their business engaging in corrupt practices.  Furthermore,, since 
the Canadian CFPOA does not impose vicarious liability on a corporation for the conduct of its 
employees, there are no statutory incentives for Canadian businesses to aggressively respond to 
the risk of corruption within their organization.  Consequently, it is possible for liability for the 
offending conduct to be limited to a single rogue employee acting in an unauthorized capacity, 
thereby absolving management of any responsibility and accountability. In contrast, in the 
American context, vicarious liability provisions provide a powerful mechanism for regulators to 
impose liability on parent corporations for the conduct of their subsidiaries and lower level 
employees and agents.109 The Canadian CFPOA could thus be strengthened by including 
provisions that require businesses to establish and maintain a system of internal controls 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 United States v. Esquenazi, No. 11-15331, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 9096 (2d Cir. May 16, 2014) at 20; Ryznar & Korkor, 
supra note 95 at 427 (Jurisprudence on instrumentalities of government have focused largely on the corruption of state-owned 
enterprises). 
104 Canadian CFPOA, supra note 34  s.2(1) sub. “foreign public official”. 
105 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(A). 
106 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(B).  
107 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(4)-(5) provides that no criminal liability shall be imposed for an individual’s failure to comply with the 
requirements set forth in paragraph (4) unless the person knowingly circumvents or knowingly fails to implement a system of 
internal accounting controls or knowingly falsifies any book, record, or account described in paragraph (2). 
108 Canadian CFPOA, supra note 34 s.4(1). 
109 Ryznar & Korkor, supra note 92 at 430. 
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sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that transactions and the use of corporate funds are 
authorized by management.110   
 
The U.S. FCPA also differs from its Canadian counterpart in that it provides a far broader range 
of penalties to sanction violations.  Most importantly, the U.S. FCPA permits regulators to 
advance both civil and criminal claims and to disgorge profits attributable to corrupt practices 
upon conviction. Individuals and corporations may also be fined twice the value of any profits 
derived or losses avoided as a result of the payment of the bribes.111  Access to a disgorgement 
remedy and specific statutory authorization to relate the magnitude of the sentence to the profits 
made or loss avoided through corruption provides regulators with the capacity to directly align 
the magnitude of the penalty with the windfall associated with the corrupt practices. Moreover, 
such a remedy may also deter corruption by making punishment proportional to the financial 
incentive to engage in corrupt practices.   
 
A final unique aspect of the United States legislation is its credit for compliance regime.  
Although Canadian courts have been willing to grant leniency to corporations that voluntarily 
disclose wrongdoing and take steps to develop internal compliance programs,112 this is not 
codified within the Canadian legislation nor are there any applicable guidance documents 
relating to sentencing under the Canada CFPOA.  By contrast, the United States’ Sentencing 
Guidelines expressly provide that an effective compliance program can reduce a potential fine by 
up to 95% and establishes particular criteria that a compliance program must include in order to 
make the corporation eligible for a reduced sentence.  These criteria include the creation of a 
whistleblower program, the ability of the program to identify the impugned act of corruption 
before it was discovered outside the organization, the promptness with which applicable 
regulators were notified and the condition that no person within the management of the 
organization “participated in, condoned or was wilfully ignorant of the offense”.113  In this way, 
corporations are provided with powerful incentives to actively identify and respond to instances 
of corruption within their organization. Such measures help to shine light on clandestine 
payments.  
 
ii. United Kingdom Bribery Act 
 
Prior to the enactment of the U.K. Bribery Act in 2010, the United Kingdom’s anti-corruption 
regime was comprised of a mix of common law prohibitions and discrete statutory provisions 
relating to bribing of domestic and foreign public officials.114  The U.K. Bribery Act was enacted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 It should be noted that the U.S. FCPA’s requirement that issuers devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls 
only applies to publicly listed companies and not all persons.  Given that the Canadian CFPOA is criminal legislation, it would 
not be possible to limit the applicability of certain provisions to only publicly listed companies as such a distinction may make 
the provision, in pith and substance, legislation regulating capital markets thus falling within provincial jurisdiction.  
111 15 U.S.C. §§78dd-2, 3, 78ff(c)(1); 18 U.S.C. §3571(d); SEC v. Titan Corp., Litigation release No. 19107, 84 SEC Docket 
3413 (1 March 2005) (Titan Corporation was disgorged of US$15.5 million in profits associated with corrupt payments to a 
foreign official in Benin).  
112 See R v. Griffiths Energy International, [2013] A.J. No. 412.  
113 Paula Desio, U.S. Sentencing Commission, An Overview of the Organizational Guidelines, online: 
<http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/organizational_guidelines/orgoverview.pdf>. 
114 Ryznar & Korkor, supra note 92 at 435. 
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in response to heavy criticism from the OECD of the United Kingdom’s anti-corruption 
regime.115  From a structural perspective, the U.K. Bribery Act differs from its American and 
Canadian counterparts in that it applies to a broader range of individuals but is more 
circumscribed in the types of offences captured by the legislation.  
 
A major distinction between the U.K. Bribery Act and the Canadian and American legislation is 
that it applies to payments made to any “person” for the purposes of inducing the person to 
improperly perform a relevant “function or activity”.116  In this manner, the U.K. Bribery Act 
overcomes the potential uncertainty that may exist as to whether an individual is a foreign public 
official and instead focuses on the character of the payment.  The relevant conduct influenced by 
the payment is defined to include both functions and activities of a public nature, as well as 
duties connected with the performance of an individual’s business or employment that the 
individual is expected perform impartially and in good faith.117  An offence will thus be 
established if the payment influences any public process or decision to be made in good faith,, 
irrespective of the character or the identity of the recipient. In this manner, the United 
Kingdom’s Bribery Act governs a wider range of activities and imposes heightened standards of 
business conduct on all beneficiaries..118 
 
Similar to the U.S. FCPA, the U.K. Bribery Act creates incentives for businesses to develop 
internal controls to prevent corruption within their organizations.  However, unlike the United 
States, which makes it an offence for public company issuers to fail to develop reasonable 
internal controls,119 the U.K. Bribery Act imposes vicarious liability on “relevant commercial 
organizations” for the conduct of persons associated with the business that provides the illegal 
bribe.120  However, the business may submit, in its defence, that it had “adequate procedures 
designed to prevent persons” from “undertaking such conduct.”121   
 
This provision differs from the American legislation in two crucial respects.  Firstly, the U.S. 
FCPA imposes a positive obligation on issuers to develop internal controls. As a result, issuers 
can be charged for non-compliance, irrespective of whether any corrupt practices take place. 122 
This allows regulators to proactively address the risk of corruption by evaluating and responding 
to inadequate internal controls within high risk businesses. The development of internal controls 
is further incentivised by the sentencing guidelines, which allow the SEC and DOJ to give 
reduced sentences when corruption occurs within a business despite the existence of adequate 
internal controls.123  By contrast, a corporation is only liable for an offence under the U.K. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Sharifa G. Hunter, “A Comparative Analysis of the FCPA and the U.K. Bribery Act and the practical Implications of Both on 
International Business” (2011) 18 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 89 at 92-95.  
116 U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 5 ss.2-3.  
117 Ibid ss.3(2) (relevant functions or activities) 3(3),(4) (the function or activity is expected to be performed in an impartial 
manner or with good faith).  
118 Ibid s.6. 
119 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(4)-(5). 
120 Bribery Act, supra note 5 s.7(1). 
121 Ibid at s.7(2).  
122 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(B).  
123 Desio, supra note 113. 
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Bribery Act if a person associated with the corporation is found to have engaged in corrupt 
conduct.124  Consequently, unlike the U.S. FCPA, the U.K. Bribery Act does not operate as a 
proactive regulatory instrument.  Second, the U.S. FCPA applies more narrowly than the U.K. 
Bribery Act as it applies only to public reporting issuers.125  By contrast, the U.K. Bribery Act 
applies to both public and private corporations.126 
 
Another significant distinction between the U.K. Bribery Act and the American and Canadian 
legislation is that the U.K. Bribery Act does not contain a books and records offence.127  
Although the United Kingdom’s Companies Act makes it an offence for companies to fail to 
maintain reasonable books and records,128 the two-year maximum sentence provided under the 
Companies Act is significantly less than the ten-year maximum sentence under the U.K. Bribery 
Act.129  By comparison, the  Canadian CFPOA imposes criminal sanctions for books and records 
offences and provides for a maximum sentence of fourteen years, which is same as the maximum 
sentence for providing a bribe.130 The American FCPA has the most comprehensive books and 
records provisions, supported by both civil and a criminal sanctions. The civil offence, which 
targets the failure to make and keep accurate books and records, is punishable through 
disgorgement and fines under the Exchange Act.131 The criminal provision targets wilful 
falsification of books and records and is a felony under the Exchange Act, punishable by up to 
twenty years imprisonment, and fines of up to five million for individuals and up to twenty-five 
million for organizations.132 Criminalizing the concealment of corrupt payments and setting 
penalties similar to the value of the provision of the bribe itself provides a powerful 
accountability mechanism, discouraging endemic corruption within an organization.  
 
Finally, unlike the Canadian CFPOA and U.S. FCPA, the U.K. Bribery Act does not contain any 
exemption for facilitation payments.133  Facilitation payments are defined in the Canadian 
CFPOA as payments that are not loans, rewards, advantages or benefits made to obtain or retain 
an advantage but are payments provided to expedite or secure the performance of any routine 
component of the foreign public official’s duties.134  The legitimacy of facilitation payments has 
been the topic of significant scholarly and regulatory debate and it has generally been accepted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 5 s.7. 
125 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(B). 
126 U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 5 s.7. 
127 Officers of companies who fail to keep accounting records adequate to show and explain the company’s transactions including 
but not limited to entries from day to day transactions may be indicted and upon conviction sentenced to up to two years in prison 
(see Companies Act 2006 supra note 88 ss.86-87). 
128 See generally: Canadian CFPOA, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. s.3(4). 
129 Bribery Act, supra note 5 s.11(1); Companies Act, supra note 88 s.387(3). 
130 Canadian CFPOA, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. s.4; 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(A).  
131 See: Provision at 15 U.S.C. § 7214; and sentencing at 15 U.S.C. §78u  
132 See: Provision at 18 U.S.C. § 1519 and 18 U.S.C. § 1520; and sentencing at  15 U.S.C. § 78ff.  
133 See: 15 U.S.C. §78dd-3(b),(f)(4); Canadian CFPOA, ibid s.3(4); Celia Wells “Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Compliance in the United Kingdom” in Preventing Corporate Corruption, S. Manacorda et al eds (New York: Springer 
International, 2014) at 507.   
134 Canadian CFPOA, ibid.  
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that, where possible, the prevalence of these payments should be reduced.135  However, because 
facilitation payments do not have the effect of distorting public decision making by incentivizing 
foreign public officials to favour one party over another, countries have been reluctant to 
criminalize these payments.  Moreover, facilitation payments may be more culturally engrained 
in certain cultures than direct bribes, which are widely recognized as creating an unfair 
marketplace.136  Nonetheless, facilitation payments do constitute a form of low-level corruption, 
which creates externalities and may perpetuate a culture where more serious corruption is 
prevalent.  Currently, the Canadian CFPOA permits companies to make facilitation payments.137  
However, Bill S-14, which received royal assent on June 19, 2013, contains provisions 
eliminating the facilitation payment exception.138  Despite the proclamation of all other 
provisions of the bill into force, the section relating to facilitation payments remains scheduled to 
come into force on a future date to be fixed by order of the Governor in Council.139   
 
Given the clear lack of international consensus on whether facilitation payments should be 
criminalized, intermediate measures may be required to garner greater unanimity.140  For 
instance, although companies are required to properly characterize facilitation payments for audit 
and books and records purposes, there is no obligation to publicly disclose these aspects of the 
company’s financials.  Greater transparency regarding the magnitude, nature and location of 
these payments could create the international pressure necessary to prompt domestic action to 
address the receipt of these payments by public officials and encourage companies to reduce 
their use of them.  This could be achieved by mandating disclosure of such payments in audited 
financial statements. Other intermediate measures might include creating a separate, less punitive 
offence for facilitation payments, or disallowing the deductibility of properly characterized 
facilitation payments for income tax purposes.  
 
f. Enhancing Global Standards For the Regulation of Corruption 
 
Although anti-corruption legislation in Canada, the United States and United Kingdom is 
structured to comply with the requirements set forth in the OECD’s “Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials”, there are significant differences between the three pieces of 
legislation.  In particular, there is a lack of consistency on the types of transfers that may 
constitute bribes and the definition of foreign public official.  Given the fact that companies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 See: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Working Group on Bribery, Recommendation of the Council 
for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (26 November 2009) at §VI, 
online: <http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44176910.pdf>; Robert Bailes, “Facilitation payments: culturally acceptable or 
unacceptably corrupt” (2006) 15:3 Business Ethics: A European Review 293; Jeffrey A. Fadiman, “A Traveler’s Guide to Gifts 
and Bribes” (1986) Hav Bus Rev 4. 
136 See generally: Bierstaker, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
137 Canadian CFPOA, supra note 34 s.3(4). 
138 Bill S-14: An Act to Amend the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, 41st parl. 2d sess. (Royal Assent, June 19, 2013), s 
3(2).  
139 Ibid s.5.  
140 See for instance: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Working Group on Bribery, Recommendation of 
the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, supra note 135 at 
§VI (recommending that countries encourage companies to eliminate the use of small facilitation payments). 
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frequently operate in many signatory jurisdictions, it is critical that these central terms have a 
common definition among the participating jurisdictions.   
 
Anti-corruption legislation can play a prominent role in creating incentives for businesses to 
address corruption risk within their organization.  All three jurisdictions adopt differing 
approaches with respect to the duties of corporations to proactively address corruption risk 
within their organization.  Canada’s approach is the most simplistic, utilizing a books and 
records provision as the sole incentive for corporations to take preventative measures. This 
strategy relies heavily on auditors to identify misattributed transactions and may allow 
management to remain apathetic towards these transactions, particularly when bribes do not have 
a discernible effect on the company’s financial statements.  By contrast, the United States and 
United Kingdom hold officers liable in certain circumstances for failing to develop adequate 
internal controls.  The authors are of the opinion that a hybrid of the American and British 
model, which holds all companies – not just public issuers – liable for failing to develop 
reasonable internal controls is most desirable as it creates incentives for companies to proactively 
respond to corruption risk within their organization.  These document can be used as models for 
the development of similar guidance in the Canadian context. 
 
A final aspect of developing of an effective anti-corruption regime is the provision of 
supplemental guidance to assist businesses in understanding how the legislation will be applied 
and how they can implement best practices to mitigate corruption risk within their organizations.  
It is worth noting that the Government of Canada has not created any regulations or guidance 
documents to assist businesses in understanding their roles and responsibilities in relation to the 
Canadian CFPOA.  By contrast, the United States’ has developed a comprehensive resource 
guide for the U.S. FCPA, which discusses the provisions of the legislation and provides 
businesses with examples of how certain conduct would be treated by the applicable regulatory 
bodies.141  A similar document was created by the United Kingdom’s Department of Justice for 
the U.K. Bribery Act.142  
 
3. Enforcement of Foreign Corrupt Practices Legislation 
A strong regulatory framework is only effective if it is appropriately enforced. For this reason, 
part three considers current jurisprudence under the Canadian CFPOA and evaluates it against 
recent, global enforcement trends. In doing so, the authors identify enforcement difficulties that 
any reform of the Canadian foreign corrupt practices framework ought to address. As the 
challenges of enforcing the Canadian CFPOA span all procedural stages, from detection to 
sentencing, our analysis focuses on the few cases under the Act that have reached judgement.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Department of Justice: Criminal Division & Enforcement Division: Securities and Exchange Commission, FCPA: A Resource 
Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (14 November 2012), online: 
<http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf>. (“FCPA Resource Guide”). 
142 Department of Justice, “The Bribery Act 2012: Guidance about procedures which relevant commercial organizations can put 
into place to prevent persons associated with them from bribing”, supra note 91. 
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a. Canadian Enforcement under the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act 
As criminal legislation, the Canadian CFPOA is administered and enforced by the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police through their specialized International Corruption Unit (“ICU”).  The 
ICU was created in 2008 and maintains teams in Calgary and Ottawa.143  The ICU operates in 
conjunction with Calgary’s Financial Integrity Unit and the Sensitive and International 
Investigations Section in Ottawa.144  These units are mandated to facilitate the investigation, 
prosecution, prevention and detection of offences under the Canadian CFPOA.145  Since its 
enactment in 1998, four convictions have been rendered under the Canadian CFPOA and the 
scope of the Act was judicially considered in one additional decision.  
 This section considers current jurisprudence under the Canadian CFPOA and evaluates these 
decisions against recent, global enforcement trends. Similar to other jurisdictions, Canada faces 
significant challenges in the enforcement of its foreign corrupt practices legislation.  In 
particular, given that enforcement actions around the world most frequently involve corruption in 
jurisdictions with low overall corruption levels, it appears that enforcement resources and 
systems may be lacking.  Although Canada’s enforcement levels are close to those in similarly 
sized jurisdictions, Canada courts appear to be  reluctant to impose heavy sentences on 
individuals involved in corruption scandals.  Moreover, given the limited case law applying the 
Canadian CFPOA, jurisprudential analysis of foreign corrupt practices is significantly less 
developed than other areas of criminal and regulatory law in Canada.  As ongoing corruption 
investigations proceed through the courts, it will be important to observe whether Canadian 
courts utilize a broader and more progressive range of sanctions, which are responsive to the 
nature of the corrupt act. 
 
i. Chowdhury v. Canada: Territorial Limits of the Corruption of Foreign Public 
Officials Act 
 
A fundamental distinction between the Canadian CFPOA and Criminal Code provisions relating 
to corruption is that the Canadian CFPOA applies, in theory, to foreign public officials who 
receive bribes or individuals who act as intermediaries in providing these bribes to foreign public 
officials. However, in Chowdhury, the Ontario Superior Court determined that a Bangladeshi 
citizen and public official, who allegedly received payments from SNC Lavalin as consideration 
for his promise to exert influence over the selection committee for a construction project in 
Bangladesh, could not be charged under the Canadian CFPOA because the act does not extend 
Canada’s jurisdiction to include foreign nationals who are not Canadian residents.146  
Consequently, the prosecution of foreign nationals and foreign public officials generally remains 
within the exclusive purview of the host state.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Royal Canadian Mounted Police “A little payment here, a little gift there” (2011) 75:3 Gazette Magazine, online: 
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144 Ibid. 
145 Gord Drayton, “International Anti Corruption Teams” Royal Canadian Mounted Police at 11, online: 
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In Chowdhury, the Crown brought charges against five individuals who allegedly participated in 
bribing Bangladeshi officials in the furtherance of SNC Lavalin’s bid to provide consultancy 
services for the construction of a bridge.147  Three of the accused were former SNC Lavalin 
employees. The other two accused , including Chowdhury, are Bangladeshi citizens and public 
officials. The applicant, Chowdhury, allegedly received payments from SNC Lavalin as 
consideration for his promise to exert influence over the selection committee for a construction 
project in Bangladesh.148 Although the Crown had not taken any steps to secure the arrest of 
Chowdhury, Chowdhury brought an application for an order of prohibition with certiorari to bar 
the Crown from advancing charges against him.149 
 
The Superior Court held that Canada has legitimate jurisdiction under the Canadian CFPOA to 
prosecute corruption offences involving Canadian citizens, even if they occur exclusively 
abroad.150 Citing the Supreme Court of Canada in Libman,151 Justice Nordheimer explained that 
Canada has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens from harms perpetrated in other 
countries.152  For this reason, the objective territoriality principle developed to allow countries to 
prosecute offences which take place abroad but which harm the prosecuting country.153 Under 
the principle of objective territoriality, an offence is subject to the jurisdiction of Canadian courts 
if there is a “real and substantial” link between Canada and the offence.154 By recognizing 
Canada’s jurisdiction to prosecute foreign corruption offences involving Canadians, Justice 
Nordheimer tacitly acknowledged that international corruption causes direct harm in Canada, 
irrespective of the location of the offense.  
 
However, Justice Nordheimer went on to distinguish between jurisdiction over an offence and 
jurisdiction over a person.155 Jurisdiction over people, as opposed to offences, is governed by 
different international principles. Sovereignty, as a foundational principle in international law, 
gives states jurisdiction over persons, conduct and events within their borders.156 The principle of 
comity creates the presumption that legislation is enacted in compliance with Canadian treaty 
obligations and should be interpreted in accordance with them. The court interpreted the 
definition of “person” under the Canadian CFPOA in light of these principles to decide whether 
it included foreign nationals located outside of Canada and whose offence was committed 
outside of Canada.  Although “person” is used in the Canadian CFPOA in an unqualified 
manner, the act does not expressly state that it applies to actions undertaken wholly outside of 
Canada.157 The court held that to assert jurisdiction over foreign nationals outside of Canada, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Ibid at paras 3, 4. 
148 Ibid at para 6. 
149 Ibid at para. 8.  
150 Ibid at para 39.  
151 Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 178. 
152 Chowdhury, supra note 146 at para. 25-26. 
153 Ibid at para 23. 
154 Ibid at para 60.  
155 Ibid at para 27.  
156 Ibid at para 29. 
157 Ibid at para 19.  
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Parliament would have to override international legal principles.  Consequently, express 
language would be required.158 Since the Canadian CFPOA does not expressly state that it 
applies to foreign nationals outside of Canada, the Court held that Canada does not have 
jurisdiction over them.159  Thus, prosecution of foreign nationals involved in a corrupt 
transaction is the purview of their home state, unless and until they voluntarily come to Canada 
or their home state chooses to surrender them.160  
 
ii. R. v. Watts: Canada’s First Conviction under the Corruption of Foreign Public 
Officials Act 
 
Eight years after the Canadian CFPOA was enacted, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
approved Canada’s first guilty plea under the act.  In Watts a lenient $25,000 fine was imposed 
against the defendant’s corporation, Hydro Kleen Systems Inc., for bribes of $28,299.88. The 
bribes had been paid to an American Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization 
Services’ official, Hector Ramirez Garcia, to expedite immigration matters for Hydro Kleen 
Systems employees traveling to the United States. 161   
 
Robert Watts was the president and controlling shareholder of Hydro Kleen Systems Inc. and 
was the “directing mind” behind a scheme to make covert payments to Garcia in exchange for 
his assistance on immigration matters. The payments were made through a partnership 
established by Garcia and his wife, as payment for Garcia’s for his assistance on immigration 
matters.162  Over the course of the scheme, Watts also took steps to conceal the fact that Garcia 
was an American official by directing Garcia not to advise employees of Hydro Kleen Systems 
of his position with the United States government or wear his Department of Justice uniform 
when visiting Hydro Kleen Systems’ premises.163  One of Watts’ conspirators also directed 
Hydro Kleen Systems employees not to acknowledge their relationship with Garcia if contacted 
by outside sources.164 
  
Hydro Kleen Systems’ corrupt practices were revealed following the execution of an Anton 
Pillar search warrant. The warrant, which granted officials the right to search Hydro Kleen 
Systems’ premises and seize evidence without warning, was obtained by one of the company’s  
competitors that had become suspicious of Hydro Kleen Systems’ preferential treatment by 
American immigration officials.165  Despite the direct involvement of senior Hydro Kleen 
Systems officers and employees in the corruption, the sentencing order was directed at Hydro 
Kleen Systems as a corporate entity and not the responsible individuals in their personal 
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159 Ibid at paras. 44-45.  
160 Ibid at para 54. 
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agreed that such treatment may have been implied by the parties). 
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capacity.  By contrast, Garcia plead guilty and was convicted under the Criminal Code for 
corruptly accepting a secret commission and sentenced to six-months in prison. After his release 
in February 2003, Garcia was deported to the United States where he faced prosecution and 
plead guilty to charges under American corruption legislation.166 
 
As demonstrated in subsequent jurisprudence, this sentence appears significantly out of step with 
subsequent fines imposed on corporations, but entirely consistent with Canada’s reluctance to 
prosecute individuals involved in a corrupt transaction in their personal capacity.  It is worth 
noting that in reviewing the appropriateness of the sentence, Justice Sirrs did not consider 
Criminal Code jurisprudence for the corruption of domestic public officials. Instead, he relied on 
the prosecution’s recommendation regarding the magnitude of the fine and its deterrent effect. 
Though he gave judicial notice to the fact that the operating minds of the corporation were able 
to escape, by way of a plea bargain, “the stigma attached to a criminal record,” he was hesitant to 
disrupt the bargain reached by the prosecution and defence.167  In the years following the Watts 
decision, Canada has been harshly criticized by the OECD for its limited and ineffectual 
enforcement efforts.168 
 
iii. R. v. Niko Resources: Strengthening the Penalties for Corruption  
 
The second conviction under the Canadian CFPOA involved Niko Resources Ltd. which plead 
guilty to bribing the Bangladeshi State Minister for Energy and Resources with the use of a 
vehicle valued at $190,984 and paying for the Minister’s travel and accommodations at a 
conference in Calgary valued at approximately $5,000.169  These bribes were facilitated by a 
Niko Resources’ agent in Bangladesh in order to mitigate negative publicity following an 
explosion at a site owned through a joint venture agreement between Niko Resources’ 
Bangladeshi subsidiary and the state-owned Bangladesh Petroleum Exploration & Production 
Company (“BAPEX”).170   
 
Following the explosion, Niko resources provided the Bangladeshi Minister with two non-
pecuniary benefits, which became the subject of the Canadian CFPOA charges.  The vehicle 
provided to the Bangladeshi Minister was originally purchased as part of the joint-venture 
agreement for BAPEX’s use and registered in BAPEX’s name.171  However, following the 
explosion and ensuing negative publicity BAPEX directed Niko Resources to provide the vehicle 
to the Bangladeshi Minister and Niko Resources followed BAPEX’s suggestion.172  Upon the 
delivery of the vehicle, Niko Resources delivered a letter to the Bangladeshi Minister thanking 
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168 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Canada’s enforcement of the foreign bribery offence still lagging; 
must urgently boost efforts to prosecute” (March 28, 2011), online: 
<http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/canadasenforcementoftheforeignbriberyoffencestilllaggingmusturgentlyboosteffortstoprosecute.
htm>.  
169 R v. Niko Resources Ltd., 2011 CarswellAlta 2521 (QB), “Agreed Statement of Facts” at paras. 4-5.  
170 See generally: ibid “Agreed Statement of Facts” at paras. 21-24.  
171 “Agreed Statement of Facts”, ibid at para. 29.  
172 “Agreed Statement of Facts”, ibid at para. 30. 
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him for his prior support and reflecting their hope that such treatment would endure in the 
coming days.173   
 
Evidence of this arrangement was revealed in an article published by a Bangladeshi newspaper 
approximately three-weeks after the vehicle was delivered to the Minister.174  Niko Resources 
was fined $8.26 million, plus a 15% victim fine surcharge and was sentenced to three-years 
probation. 175  The probation order obligated Niko Resources to, among other things, disclose any 
ongoing criminal or administrative investigations to the RCMP during the duration of the 
probation, cooperate fully with any subsequent investigations relating to matters contained in the 
Agreed Statement of Facts, strengthen its “compliance, record keeping, and internal controls 
standards” in accordance with the procedures set out in the probation order and report 
periodically regarding its implementation of these procedures.176  Disregarding the precedent 
established by the Watts guilty plea, Justice Brooker considered the range of fines imposed in 
American corruption cases.177  This increased sensitivity to international jurisprudence and 
sentencing guidelines may be a response to the international criticism of Canada’s enforcement 
of its foreign corruption legislation.  
 
iv. R. v. Griffiths Energy International: Leniency for Voluntary Disclosure of the 
Corruption of Foreign Public Officials by members of an Corporation 
 
The third Canadian corruption conviction involved Griffiths Energy International, which plead 
guilty to providing payments of US$2 million plus founders’ shares of Griffiths Energy to a 
corporation controlled by the wife of the Chadian ambassador to the United States.178   
 
The charges in this case arose from Griffiths Energy and its predecessor Mogul Energy 
International’s acquisition of oil and gas exploration properties in the Republic of Chad from 
2008-2011.179  In 2009, Griffiths Energy International was created to facilitate investment in 
Chad.  In furtherance of this investment, Griffiths Energy entered into a US$2 million consulting 
agreement.  The consulting agreement was first entered into with a Maryland corporation 
“Ambassade du Tchad LLC” which was created by the Chadian ambassador in Washington.  The 
funds payable in conjunction with this consulting agreement were to be transferred after the 
purchase of the exploration properties closed.  However, Griffiths Energy’s former external 
counsel advised that the consulting agreement could constitute an illegal bribe and the consulting 
agreement was terminated with no payments being made.180   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 “Agreed Statement of Facts”, ibid at para. 33 (As the Canadian parent corporation, Niko Resources admitted that, for criminal 
law purposes, it would be deemed to know of the letter.). 
174 “Agreed Statement of Facts”, ibid at para.38. 
175 Niko Resources Ltd., ibid at para. 5.  
176 Niko Resources Ltd., ibid at Exhibit 1 – “Probation Order”.  
177 Niko Resources Ltd., ibid at para. 9.  
178 Carrie Tait, “Griffiths to pay millions in African bribery case” (January 22, 2013) The Globe and Mail, online: 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/griffiths-to-pay-millions-in-african-
bribery-case/article7622364/>; Griffiths Energy International, supra note 112 at para. 7.  
179See generally: “Exhibit 1: Agreed Statement of Facts” in R v Griffiths Energy International, ibid. 
180 Ibid at paras. 19-21. 
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Weeks later, a second, identical consulting agreement was drafted between a Nevada 
corporation, Chad Oil Consulting LLC, which was wholly owned by the Chadian ambassador’s 
wife, Ms. Niam, and Griffiths Energy.  At the same time, Ms. Niam and two of her associates 
were issued a total of 4 million founders’ shares in Griffiths Energy at a price of $0.001 per 
share.181  Nine days later, a memorandum of understanding between the Government of Chad 
and Griffiths Energy was concluded with respect to the impugned exploration properties.  As a 
result of regulatory changes in Chad, the consulting agreement with Chad Oil Consulting LLC 
was referred to Griffiths Energy’s new external counsel who redrafted the consulting agreement 
to incorporate the revised purchase agreement and to hold the $2 million in escrow pending the 
closing of the transaction.  Once the transaction was completed, the external counsel released the 
funds from escrow and they were transferred to an account provided by an official at the Chadian 
Embassy in Washington in early 2011.182 
 
After the completion of this acquisition, Griffiths Energy’s management team and board of 
directors changed. None of the incoming directors or managers were aware of the consulting 
agreements.  The impugned transactions were later uncovered during diligence in advance of the 
company’s initial public offering and following a comprehensive internal investigation, the 
Public Prosecution Service of Canada and Alberta Justice were advised of the corrupt 
transactions.183 
 
When reviewing proposed fines of $9 million plus a 15% victim fine surcharge, the Alberta 
Court of Queen’s Bench noted that Griffiths Energy had voluntarily disclosed the corruption to 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”), cooperated fully with the investigation and 
implemented a comprehensive and robust anti-corruption program following the discovery.184  
The Court was particularly sensitive to the fact that had the new officers and directors of 
Griffiths Energy not voluntarily disclosed the corruption, it was “[c]onceivable…this crime 
might never have been discovered”.185  Despite their involvement in facilitating the bribes, no 
criminal convictions were registered against either Griffiths or Tyab for their involvement in the 
corrupt business practices. No disciplinary actions were taken against any of the advisors 
involved in the payment of the bribes and issuance of the founders’ shares.186   
 
v. R. v. Karigar: Canada’s First Conviction of an Individual Under the Corruption 
of Foreign Public Officials Act 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Ibid at paras. 22-27. 
182 Ibid at para. 33-38. 
183 Ibid.  
184 Griffiths Energy International, supra note 3 at paras. 15-19. 
185 Ibid at para. 15. 
186 Carrie Tait & Kelly Cryderman, “The Canadian energy executive at the centre of the Griffiths corruption scandal” (January 
24, 2013) The Globe and Mail, online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-
resources/the-Canadian-energy-executive-at-the-centre-of-the-griffiths-corruption-scandal/article7725093/> (note that Brad 
Griffiths perished in 2011 before a conviction was entered against Griffiths Energy). 
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In 2013, following a full trial, the Ontario Superior Court rendered the first criminal sentence of 
an individual under the Canadian CFPOA to Nazir Karigar who was convicted of providing a 
US$450,000 bribe to Air India officials and the Indian Minister of Civil Aviation as 
consideration for favourable treatment on the tendering of government contracts.  As a result of 
his involvement in the bribery, Karigar was sentenced to three years imprisonment.187   
 
Karigar had acted as an agent in India for his co-conspirator, Robert Bell, who was responsible 
for tendering Cryptometrics Canada’s bid for a number of Air India contracts.  While preparing 
the bid, Karigar and Bell were advised by one of Karigar’s business associates in India that 
bribes were required to secure a contract from Air India.188  As a result, Bell arranged for the 
funds to be transferred to Karigar who in turn directed them to the Indian Minister of Civil 
Aviation.  
 
However, after transferring the funds to the Indian Minister of Civil Aviation, Karigar did not 
receive confirmation that the contract had been awarded in his favour.  In response, he 
voluntarily approached the Canadian Consulate in Mumbai and advised an official that the 
Indian Minister of Civil Aviation had misappropriated their bribe. He then requested immunity 
from any charges that might result from the previously disclosed act of bribery.189  Instead, 
Canadian officials charged Karigar with violating section 3 of the Canadian CFPOA. Robert Bell 
was granted immunity from prosecution in exchange for testifying against Karigar.190 
 
In determining the appropriate sentence, the Court considered jurisprudence relating to serious 
criminal fraud and corruption by domestic public officials and held that imprisonment of three to 
five years was generally appropriate for crimes of this nature.191  Although a three year sentence 
was on the upper end of the five-year maximum for the corruption of foreign public officials, it 
should be noted that the Canadian CFPOA was amended after Karigar was charged  to increase 
the maximum sentence from five to fourteen years imprisonment.192  It is thus unclear whether 
subsequent courts will feel compelled to follow the sentencing guidelines established in Karigar 
or will impose the more stringent sentences now available under the act. 
 
vi. Analysis of Canadian Enforcement Trends under the Corruption of Foreign 
Public Officials Act 
 
Although there is limited jurisprudence under the Canadian CFPOA, current enforcement efforts 
show a troubling lack of consistency both in terms of the magnitude of sentences issued and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 R v. Karigar, 2013 ONSC 5119 (A subsequent bribe of $650,000 US was also paid by Cryptometrics Canada’s American 
parent corporation Cryptometrics Inc.). 
188 Ibid at para. 7  
189 Ibid at para. 15. 
190 “RCMP Charge Individuals with Foreign Corruption” (June 4, 2014) Royal Canadian Mounted Police, online: 
<http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ottawa/ne-no/pr-cp/2014/0604-corruption-eng.htm> (The RCMP have also charged United States 
nationals, Robert Barra and Dario Berini, who were the former CEO and COO of Cryptometrics and U.K. national Shailesh 
Govindia, who was an agent of Cryptometics, with criminal fraud and corruption under the Criminal Code and Canadian 
CFPOA). 
191 R v. Karigar, 2014 ONSC 3093 at paras 20-24, 29-32. 
192 Bill S-14: An Act to Amend the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, supra note 138.  
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number of individuals prosecuted to date.  Most notably, the $25,000 fine in Watts appears 
grossly disproportionate to the $8.26 million fine issued in Niko Resources, particularly when 
one considers the complicity of senior officials in Watts.  Moreover, the amount of the fine does 
not appear commensurate with the value of the bribe provided, as fines range from 0.9 to 48.5 
times the value of the initial payment.   
 
A second concern relates to the use of criminal sanctions against individuals involved in the 
corrupt activity. To date, none of the individuals responsible for providing the funds used to 
bribe foreign public officials have been held personally responsible for the payment.  Rather, 
criminal sanctions have focused on the intermediaries involved in the corruption. The Karigar 
case is a prime example. Robert Bell, the Canadian Vice President, Business Development, of 
Cryptometrics Canada provided the payment to Karigar who ultimately delivered the bribe to 
Indian officials. Bell himself was not indicted after he agreed to testify against Karigar. 
Similarly, in Watts, the American public official retained by Hydro Kleen Systems was 
prosecuted under the Criminal Code for accepting the bribes. Yet Robert Watts, who had 
arranged the bribery scheme, was able to negotiate to have the conviction registered against 
Hydro Kleen Systems rather than himself.  Consequently, Canadian senior officers have, to this 
point, been able to avoid direct responsibility for their business practices and have avoided 
prosecution while the corporations have been convicted in place of the individuals.   
 
With respect to the location or industry of the prosecutions, there appears to be no clear trends 
within the Canadian jurisprudence or Canadian involvement in foreign corrupt practices.  
Although cases on foreign corrupt practices have been concentrated in Alberta and Ontario, these 
convictions yield little evidence on broader patterns regarding corrupt business practices 
perpetrated by Canadian corporations or the effectiveness of the enforcement practices of 
Canadian law enforcement officials.  To date, all convictions for foreign corrupt practices have 
resulted from investigations conducted by private parties or voluntary disclosure by the 
accused.193 This suggests that effective detection of corrupt business practices is largely 
influenced by the internal controls within corporations and investigations by non-governmental 
and governmental organizations in the foreign jurisdiction.  However, it is worth noting that the 
locations of these prosecutions correspond with the RCMP’s two ICUs, based in Calgary, 
Alberta and Ottawa, Ontario,194 suggesting that effective access to these law enforcement 
agencies may help promote greater regional awareness and facilitate disclosure of illegal 
business practices. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Similarly, recent criminal charges against SNC Lavalin for allegedly paying $35 million in bribes to Libyan government 
officials were uncovered by SNC Lavalin’s audit committee following an internal investigation (“RCMP Charges SNC-Lavalin” 
(February 19, 2015) Royal Canadian Mounted Police, online: <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ottawa/ne-no/pr-cp/2015/0219-
lavalin-eng.htm>; “SNC-Lavalin provides update on announcement of 2011 financial results and impact on 2011 outlook” 
(February 28, 2012) SNC Lavalin, online: <http://www.snclavalin.com/en/snclavalin-provides-update-on-announcement-of-
2011-financial-results-and-impact-on-2011-outlook>; SNC Lavalin “SNC-Lavalin Reports Results of Voluntary Independent 
Review” (March 26, 2012) SEDAR.) following which a criminal investigation was commenced by the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (Tu Thanh Ha & Ingrid Peritz “RCMP searching SNC-Lavalin headquarters” (April 13, 2012) The Globe and Mail, 
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traditional criminal law enforcement regimes.  
194 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, supra note 182. 
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Despite a marked increase in the number of Canadian CFPOA convictions, the relatively small 
number of prosecutions underscores the challenges associated with identifying and prosecuting 
corruption. Payments which exchange hands abroad, often through foreign subsidiaries, third-
parties, or intermediaries, are notoriously difficult for law enforcement based in Canada to trace. 
As a result, corporations themselves appear best positioned to detect corrupt practices within 
their business and put controls in place to prevent them. The implementation of a regulatory 
pyramid which uses disclosure requirements and low level sanctions to motivate corporations to 
implement preventative measures will shift the enforcement burden from the RCMP, which 
achieves enforcement poorly and at high cost, to the corporation themselves. In designing this 
pyramid, Canadian policy makers will benefit from greater understanding of the types and 
prevalence of corruption occurring around the world. A clearer understanding of the forms 
corruption takes within bureaucratic and political structures will also facilitate more precise and 
cost effectiveness enforcement efforts. 
 
Once a better understanding of the market for corrupt payments has been established the authors 
are of the opinion that a regulatory pyramid model should be employed to focus enforcement 
resources and intensity on reducing the prevalence of institutional corruption.  Such an approach 
would commit resources to working with companies to develop internal compliance programs 
and use sanctions that encourage behaviour modification when companies fail to comply.  Given 
the prominent role of the audit committee and internal controls within corporations previously 
sanctioned under the Canadian CFPOA it is evident that domestic regulation must look to 
capitalize on the unique ability of companies to identify fraud within their organization.  This 
could be achieved through a combination of partnerships between law enforcement and 
businesses as well as potential regulatory changes that incentivize businesses operating in foreign 
jurisdictions to develop these controls.  For instance, businesses could receive reduced sentences 
if they uncover instances of corruption in a timely manner and harsher sentences if the corruption 
is not uncovered for a protracted period of time, identified by whistleblowers or uncovered by 
law enforcement.  Simply by way of example, such a regime could provide a 75% reduction in 
an offender’s sentence if the corruption is uncovered within 1 year, 50% within two years, 25% 
after three years and no reduction if the corruption is discovered after four or more years.  
Moreover, under the current Canadian CFPOA there are no incentives for individuals or 
corporations to disclose foreign corrupt practices within an organization if they were not party to 
the impugned transaction.  Imposing vicarious liability on certain core employees or officers who 
fail to report corruption that they become aware of or are willfully blind to would help address 
the incentives that exist for companies to suppress or ignore corrupt payments made at lower 
levels within the organizational structure thereby incentivizing companies to develop robust 
compliance programs.  
 
In sum, the authors are of the opinion that both statutory amendments and more proactive 
engagement by law enforcement officials to identify patterns of corruption at all levels are 
necessary to provide greater enforcement effectiveness. A regulatory pyramid should be 
employed to promote a more comprehensive and holistic approach to the regulation of Canadian 
businesses operating abroad.  Both regulatory scrutiny and sanctions should reflect the nature of 
the offence and the prior conduct of the organization to ensure that the regulatory system 
operates to incentivize compliance rather than sporadically sanction what appears to be the most 
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egregious conduct.  In order to achieve this end, a clearer understanding of the incentives and 
interactions giving rise to foreign corrupt practices in foreign jurisdictions is required.  
 
b. International Foreign Corrupt Practices Enforcement Activities 
 
In December 2014, the OECD released a comprehensive report on foreign corrupt practices 
enforcement actions initiated since the ratification of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention of 
February 15, 1999.195  This section discusses the findings of the report with a view to identifying 
the strengths and shortcomings of global anti-corruption investigation and enforcement efforts. 
 
At the outset it should be noted that the OECD’s analysis focuses on enforcement actions rather 
than the actual provision of bribes or occurrence of corruption.  As a result, these statistics my 
reflect systemic selection biases resulting from the potential tendency of law enforcement to 
direct investigative and enforcement resources towards sectors perceived as having a high risk of 
corruption as well as prosecutions which are regarded as having the highest potential deterrent 
effects.  
 
As previously identified, two of the principal challenges associated with the enforcement of anti-
corruption legislation is the clandestine nature of bribes and fact that evidence of the offence is 
frequently located outside of the enforcing jurisdiction.  Thus it is not surprising that one third of 
cases resulted from self-reporting, of which, 31% were disclosed following the discovery of the 
bribes in the course of an internal audit and 28% through transactional due diligence.196 Only 
26% of cases resulted from investigations initiated directly by law enforcement officials or 
mutual legal assistance between countries.197 A further 2% of cases of corruption are reported by 
whistleblowers.198  By contrast, in instances of financial fraud in the United States, employees 
report 17% of corporate frauds to authorities.199  This difference may be indicative of differences 
in cultural attitudes towards corruption as compared to corporate fraud.  Assuming that there is 
less of a cultural stigma towards corruption as compared to fraud, the significant negative 
consequences facing whistleblowers may be accentuated if they come forward to disclose 
corruption.200   
 
Interestingly, 67% of bribes were paid to public officials in countries with medium to very-high 
development on the United Nation’s Human Development Index.201 This is paradoxical given 
that Transparency International’s Corruption Index observes that corruption is perceived to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 See: OECD Foreign Bribery Report: An Analysis of the Crime of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (OECD Publishing, 
2014).  
196 Ibid at 8-9.  
197 Ibid at 9.  
198 Ibid. 
199 Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, “Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?” (2010) 65:6 The Journal of 
Finance 2213 at 2214.  Note that this statistic pre-dates the introduction of whistleblower rewards under Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376-2223 §922 (“Dodd Frank Act”). 
200 Ibid at 2245 (whistleblowers of corporate fraud may face significant professional and personal consequences.  However, qui 
tam legislation, which provides whistleblowers on domestic frauds against the United States government with rewards of 15-40% 
has significantly increased the number of whistleblowers who are willing to disclose frauds against government).   
201 OECD Foreign Bribery Report: An Analysis of the Crime of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, supra note 187 at 29-30. 
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more prevalent in less developed countries.202 As previously mentioned, these statistics only 
address bribes that were successfully prosecuted. This finding highlights the role of detection and 
enforcement resources in revealing corruption and underscores the benefits of involving 
additional market participants and gatekeepers to assist in uncovering corrupt business practices.  
 
The sources through which these bribes were discovered highlights the importance of an 
effective gatekeeper regimes as well as the opportunities for enhanced incentives for 
whistleblowers.  Recognizing the prominent role of gatekeepers such as auditors, financial 
advisors and lawyers, in uncovering instances of corruption, regulatory structures should be 
designed to capitalize on their unique position and increase the opportunity for these 
professionals to uncover corruption.  To this end and given that traditional law enforcement may 
be limited by the fact that much of the evidence regarding the acts of corruption is located 
outside of their jurisdiction, gatekeepers must play a particularly prominent role in uncovering 
corruption and encouraging companies to take appropriate actions.  The OECD’s report provides 
valuable assistance on the types of transactions and foreign public officials most frequently 
engaged in corruption.  Public procurement is the most common purpose of bribes, accounting 
for 57% of all sanctioned transactions followed by customs clearance with 12% of sanctions.203  
Additionally, officials within state-owned enterprises are the most common recipients of bribes, 
receiving 80% of sanctioned payments.204  This information provides a starting point for auditors 
and other gatekeepers to develop and implement controls designed to reduce opportunities for 
bribery in these circumstances, detect non-compliance and identify effective subsidiary 
governance policies.  However, the report also highlights the importance of gatekeepers 
acquiring a keen understanding of the operations of their client and markets in which they 
operate as 41% of bribery cases involve local agents and an additional 35% of cases involve the 
use of corporations or consultancy arrangements designed to obscure the nature of the 
relationship or transaction.205 
 
Among the signatories to the OECD Anti-Bribery convention, the United States has been the 
most active, having issued sanctions in relation to 128 separate instances of bribery.  By 
comparison, Germany issued sanctions in relation to 26 separate schemes, Korea in 11 and the 
United Kingdom, Italy and Switzerland in 6 separate schemes.206 Although Canadian 
enforcement activity lags behind that of the United States, the four schemes sanctioned by 
Canadian authorities are not dissimilar to the enforcement activity of other similarly situated 
countries.207  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 See generally: United Nations Development Programme, “Table 1: Human Development Index and its components” (2013) 
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International, “Corruption Perception Index 2013” Transparency International Canada Inc., online: 
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206 Ibid at 9. 
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Finally, criminal and civil fines are the most common form of punishment for foreign corrupt 
practices,208 reflecting hesitancy on the part of regulators to use alternative, more progressive 
forms of punishment designed to encourage long-term compliance.  Over the past five years, 
criminal and civil fines levied against offenders have averaged approximately US $15.3 
million.209  Although the mean average may be distorted by outlier fines, this figure provides 
support for the general observation that, despite the growth in recent fines, Canadian sentencing 
of foreign corrupt practices is less punitive than other jurisdictions. 
 
Global foreign corrupt practices enforcement trends reflect a general hesitancy among developed 
nations to aggressively prosecute corruption.  To this end, heightened international cooperation 
in the detection, investigation and prosecution of foreign corrupt practices may be necessary in 
order to increase the regulatory capacity of these jurisdictions.  When corruption is identified, 
countries appear most comfortable utilizing criminal or punitive civil sanctions to discipline 
individuals or corporations found to have engaged in corrupt practices.  Although punitive 
sentences may have a deterrent effect they lack the progressivity necessary to foster a 
comprehensive regulatory regime.  Recognizing that many businesses at risk of foreign corrupt 
practices may operate in multiple jurisdictions, further harmonization of the anti-corruption 
regulatory regimes around the world may provide the foundation and critical mass of regulatory 
actions necessary to develop an effective regulatory pyramid.  
	  
4. Proposals for Developing a Comprehensive Regulatory Regime for Reducing to the 
Supply of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials 
 
Corruption impacts at least two dimensions of economic development and competition.  
Domestically, corruption impedes social mobility and the efficient allocation of capital. 
Internationally, it allows the provider of bribes to gain an unfair and unequal regulatory 
advantage over its competitors. To the extent that there is inequality in the intensity, 
effectiveness and treatment of corruption across multiple jurisdictions, corporations may be able 
to gain an unfair competitive advantage by operating out of jurisdictions where corruption is less 
stringently regulated. Conversely, consistent regulatory intensity, effectiveness and treatment 
across suppliers of corrupt payments to foreign public officials has the potential to level the 
playing field and reduce the need for corporations to pay bribes to remain competitive. 
Recognition of the benefits of collective action has been the driving force behind OECD and UN 
conventions on corruption.210 However, the benefits of collective action must be realized through 
independent measures on the part of all signatory countries to implement the principles and best 
practices agreed upon through domestic legislation and enforcement.  
 
Canada’s record on implementing UN and OECD recommendations has been poor. In its 2011 
Phase 3 Report, the OECD Working Group on Bribery observed that “significant concerns… 
remain about Canada’s framework for implementing the Convention.”211 It highlighted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 OECD Foreign Bribery Report, supra note 187 at 18. 
209 Ibid at 13, 20.  
210 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 61, at 5 (Preamble).  
211 “Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Canada”, supra note 76, at 5. 
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awareness of the Canadian CFPOA, internal compliance programs, and voluntary disclosure of 
violations as areas in which Canada lags behind.212 Part four discusses the essential role that 
internal controls, which prevent corruption from within corporations, play in addressing the 
occurrence of foreign corrupt practices propose that Canadian corporate and securities law be 
used to provide a foundation for a regulatory pyramid that incentivizes the development of 
internal controls within firms and employs progressive sanctions to disincentivise corrupt 
practices at all levels.  
 
Although the regulation of bribery of foreign public officials reduces the incentives to provide 
corrupt payments, it does not correspondingly reduce the incentives for public officials to solicit 
bribes.  Brademas and Heimann note that absent social and political reforms in the recipient 
jurisdiction “[t]he demand side – extortion and other forms of corruption by public officials – is 
more difficult to target effectively” since laws prohibiting officials from taking bribes are 
unlikely to be enforced.213 Moreover, the ability of corporations to comply with applicable 
legislation may be challenged when the business operations are in jurisdictions where corruption 
is common place.214  The difficulties of asymmetrical regulation highlight the need for 
sophisticated regulatory structures to incentivize compliance and sanction corruption at all levels 
within supply-side jurisdictions.  
 
When domestic foreign corrupt practices legislation functions effectively, it can be regarded as a 
stop-gap measure, which provides an opportunity for these jurisdictions to undertake the 
“wholesale change necessary” to combat corruption domestically and remove public officials 
who solicit bribes.215 While these changes are underway, foreign corrupt practices legislation 
must create sufficient disincentives to discourage businesses from providing illegal payments to 
foreign public officials and incentivize these corporations to publicly identify, investigate and 
respond to acts of corruption by their employees. Though foreign corrupt practices legislation 
must be sophisticated to effectively reduce the supply of bribes, the sanctions used must also be 
proportionate. Countries must be careful not increase the regulatory risk associated with 
operating in these jurisdictions to such an extent that businesses will forego foreign investment 
altogether. The resulting reduction in international activity and foreign investment could harm 
the recipient state more than the corrupt practices being targeted.  
 
What is needed is a mix of targeted regulatory sanctions that draw from all levels of the 
regulatory pyramid, including corporate governance based solutions to incentivize compliance, 
private and public monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, fines and where appropriate, 
adequate prison sentences that address corruption at all levels of the supply chain. It may not be 
sufficient to target only the high-profile, brazen instances of bribery committed by senior 
corporate officials within a corporation or payments made to senior public officials. Focusing 
enforcement at this level may ignore corruption at lower levels within corporations and within 
state bureaucracies or payments of smaller amounts.  When anti-corruption initiatives only target 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Ibid at 60, 61.  
213 Brademas & Heimann, supra note 2 at 21.  
214 Harriman Randall, supra note 9 at 673.  
215 Brademas & Heimann, supra note 2 at 22.  
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one level of corruption, prevailing cultural and institutional pressures persist, which enable 
corruption to re-emerge when these targeted enforcement efforts are scaled back.216 
 
The lack of a correlation between enforcement actions and a firm’s perception of the risk of 
violations being identified within their institution underscores the need for and role of internal 
controls in informing and guiding the entity’s perception of regulatory risk.  Once the initial 
deterrent effect of newly enacted regulatory regime is attained, internal controls developed to 
implement these regulations provide the supplemental supports necessary to ensure effective 
compliance.217  Analysis of jurisprudence under the Canadian CFPOA has highlighted the 
important role of corporate compliance regimes in uncovering, reporting and responding to 
foreign corrupt practices.  However, given that much of the corruption successfully prosecuted in 
Canada to date was discovered through voluntary disclosure made by the impugned corporations 
following an internal investigation, it may also be inferred that a there is a significant volume of 
offending conduct that is continuing undetected due to inadequate detection mechanisms within 
the subject firm or its unwillingness to publicly disclose such conduct.  Unlike the American and 
British legislation, the Canadian CFPOA does not include any mechanisms to promote the 
development of internal compliance and voluntary disclosure.  Recognizing this gap, a 
fundamental mechanism for addressing corruption should be the development of regulation that 
requires or incentivizes corporations to develop internal controls capable of identifying and 
responding illegal conduct within the firm.  Applying Ayers and Braithwaite’s regulatory 
pyramid, regulations designed to facilitate the development of such controls should focus on 
promoting compliance by market participants.   
 
a. Internal Controls: Preventing Corruption from Within the Corporation  
	  
To understand how Canadian corporate and securities law can be used to round out the Canadian 
regulatory framework by promoting internal controls within corporations, it is first necessary to have an 
understanding of the form these internal controls might take. It is important to recognize that the form and 
complexity that internal controls to prevent corruption should and will vary widely depending on the size 
of the firm, the industry it operates in, and the type and level of corruption risk its business presents.218 
The Canadian corporate landscape is extremely diverse. Canadian business is broadly diversified 
across range of industries, including mining and natural resource extraction, finance, farming and 
manufacturing. Firm sizes in Canada also differ widely, with businesses with over 500 
employees accounting for 45.7% of GDP and small and medium-sized businesses accounting for 
54.3% of GDP in 2005.219 This heterogeneity of Canadian business corporations suggests that a 
one-size-fits all approach to regulating foreign corrupt practices may be impractical and militates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Ksenia, supra note 68 at 226 (For instance, corruption levels quickly escalated to prior levels in Hong Kong and Pakistan 
because these programs failed to address corruption at all levels of government). 
217 Neil A. Gunningham, Dorothy Thornton & Robert A. Kagan, “Motivating Management: Corporate Compliance in 
Environmental Protection” (2005) 27 Law & Pol’y 289 at 294-295. 
218 FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 138 at  56. 
219 Danny Leung, Luke Rspoli and Rob Gibson, “Small, Medium-sized and Largue Businesses in the Canadian Economy: 
Measuring Their Contribution to Gross Domestic Product” in Economic Analysis Research Paper Series Catalogue 
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in favour of a principles-based approach to regulating corporations.220 In this context, it would be 
unadvisable and inconsistent with Canada’s approach to corporate law to recommend that 
Canadian companies be mandated to implement specific internal control mechanisms. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to identify three broad categories of internal control mechanisms 
which should be promoted within Canadian corporations. 
 
The development of internal controls designed to address corruption risk within an organization 
can be structured first, around the board of directors, second, around the development of an 
enterprise-wide culture of compliance and third, in relation to internal policies and enforcement 
mechanisms.  As the board of dicrectors provides central accountability and direction to the 
corporation, the development of a system of internal controls should originate at the board 
level.221  Ensuring adequate diversity and experience on the board and committees responsible 
for developing such internal controls is critical.222  As previously discussed, one of the principal 
challenges associated with developing a regulatory response to foreign corrupt practices is 
understanding and accounting for the diverse cultural, social and regulatory factors that influence 
a corrupt transaction.  To this end, ensuring a diverse board will assist in evaluating the variety 
of risk factors that the company may face. As will later be explored in more depth, risk 
management forms the essence of directors’ duties to the corporation.223 The “tone at the top” 
with respect to corruption also plays a vital role in discouraging corrupt practices throughout the 
organization.224 
 
Transparency and accountability are fundamental for mitigating the risk of corruption.  In 
particular, the guide to the U.S. FCPA underscores the importance of maintaining books, records, 
and accounts, which reflect the assets and transactions of the issuer and ensure that the funds 
were, in fact, utilized for such purpose.225  Second, in concert with the board, a code of conduct 
specifically addressing foreign corrupt practices should be developed outlining such matters as 
the responsibilities of employees, and developing a confidential whistleblowing hotline which 
enables employees, contractors and other stakeholders to anonymously report suspected 
instances of corruption to management.226  These guides should be accessible to employees and 
other stakeholders in a variety of languages and formats, contemplate a wide variety of scenarios 
and types of payments and provide a clear accountability framework which can assure all parties 
subject to the policy that any instances of wrongdoing will be dealt with expeditiously.  Such 
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221 Barry Reiter, Directors’ Duties in Canada, 5th ed (Toronto: CCH Canadian Limited, 2012) at 823-24. 
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accountability mechanisms should employ both internal and external monitors to ensure that they 
are properly implemented. 
 
Finally, the development of internal anti-corruption policies and procedures should be 
complemented by educational curricula designed to foster a culture of compliance within all 
levels of the firm. Educational initiatives should promote a clear understanding of the risks for 
and appropriate responses to solicitations to engage in corrupt conduct, with particular emphasis 
on how perceptions of corruption differ across cultures. Policies, procedures, and educational 
programs should be clearly communicated within the organization and embodied by the conduct 
of management at all levels.227 
 
b. Directors’ Duties: Corproate Law as a Tool to Promote the Development of Anti-
Compliance Regimes 
 
A director’s duty to supervise the operation and management of the corporation provides a useful 
mechanism for promoting enhanced compliance.228 Directors owe a duty of care which requires 
them to act in a careful and informed manner, and exercise the care, diligence and skill of a 
reasonably prudent person in comparable circumstances.229 They also have a fiduciary duty to act 
in the best interests of the corporation.230  In order to discharge these duties, directors have an 
obligation to identify and mitigate risks, typically through the development of a system of 
internal controls.231  Canadian courts generally rely on the presence or absence of a proper 
process to evaluate whether directors have satisfied their duty of care.232  Although courts will 
not attempt to second-guess or substitute their judgement for that of the board of directors, the 
development of an effective process by the board serves as a proxy for quality decision-
making.233  When applied to the issue of foreign corrupt practices, it is conceivable that where a 
corporation faces risk of its employees providing illegal bribes, its directors already owe a duty 
to take reasonable steps to mitigate such risks and could be held liable, as a matter of corporate 
law, for their failure to respond to corruption risk. Judicial recognition of such a duty would 
provide a powerful incentive for boards to develop and monitor internal compliance mechanisms 
designed to mitigate corruption risk.  
 
Courts are becoming increasingly attuned to the relationship between effective risk management 
controls and the fiduciary duties of directors.  In particular, in the United States, courts have 
increasingly begun to impose liability where directors have failed to implement reasonable 
safeguards to mitigate identified risks or failed to turn their mind to such risk factors 
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altogether.234 Though Delaware courts have imposed a high burden for establishing liability 
where a board has failed to turn its mind to or has neglected significant risk factors, recognition 
of directors’ duties to implement risk management strategies nonetheless provides a promising 
tool for allowing shareholders to hold directors accountable when corruption risks are 
unreasonably overlooked.  Recognizing a similar doctrine in Canada could provide the necessary 
foundation for ensuring that directors have a positive obligation to address foreign corrupt 
practices risk within their organization. . Judicial recognition of a directors’ duty to address 
foreign corrupt practices risk could provide a simple yet effective mechanism for ensuring 
corporations begin to take steps to address corruption risk while not requiring a legislative 
amendment to the Canadian CFPOA.   
 
The duty to address risks stemming from corruption is arguably already a part of directors’ duties 
to act with reasonable care and in the best interests of the corporation. However, clearly 
establishing this area of responsibility through case law will take time, persistent efforts on the 
part of plaintiffs’ counsel, and the serendipitous union of favourable facts with a sympathetic 
judge.  For this reason, the evolution of directors’ duties has in some instances been driven by 
legislation. For instance, amendments to employment standards and business corporations 
statutes have been used to establish personal liability of directors for debts to employees of the 
company, in the event that the company is unable to pay, up to the amount of six months’ 
wages.235 Legislation has also been used to articulate directors’ duties under the Environmental 
Protection Act (Ontario), which provides that directors have a positive duty to take all reasonable 
care to prevent the unlawful discharge of contaminants into the environment and to ensure the 
Ministry of the Environment is notified in the event that such discharge occurs.236 A similar 
legislative amendment requiring directors to take all reasonable steps to address corruption risk 
within the corporation may provide a faster and more stable grounds for using directors’ duties 
and personal liability to motivate the development of internal controls to prevent corruption in 
Canada.  
 
Whether it is achieved through judicial decision-making or legislative amendment, the 
development of directors’ duties to address corruption risks provides an attractive mechanism to 
motivate boards to implement anti-corruption programs. The civil liability of directors provide a 
particularly attractive regulatory tool in that enforcement costs are born not by the state, but 
rather by the stakeholders who suffer losses as a result of corruption.  
 
a. Corporate Governance: The role of Auditors in Corruption Detection 
 
Corporate law practice and jurisprudence have imposed strong pressure on corporations to 
formalize their risk management and governance processes through the development of series of 
internal controls designed to monitor and manage identified risk factors.237 Directors’ obligations 
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to mitigate risks within the corporation and develop strategies to respond to them are often 
fulfilled with the aid of the firm’s auditor, particularly in areas of high audit risk. The audit 
committee of the board of directors, in conjunction with the corporation’s external auditors, 
serve a critical role in developing, monitoring and enforcing internal controls designed to ensure 
compliance with the myriad of applicable regulatory regimes.238   
 
All public corporations are required to maintain an audit committee of not less than three 
directors, the majority of whom must be independent from the corporation.239  This 
independence allows audit committees to evaluate areas of particular audit risk, develop policies 
and controls designed to address such risk factors and in concert with the corporation’s internal 
and external auditors, evaluate the efficacy of these controls.  In doing so, the audit committee is 
uniquely positioned to identify corruption risk and will generally possess the expertise to 
effectively evaluate these areas of concern.240  Incorporating analysis of corruption risk into the 
mandate of an audit committee could thus provide a strong mechanism for ensuring that foreign 
corrupt practices are treated with the same seriousness as other financial reporting matters within 
the corporation.   
 
The International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing establish a series of 
standards relating to fraud within an organization, which includes the provision of illegal 
payments through bribery and corruption.  Central to these controls is the tone set by 
management and the board with respect to governance processes, corporate conduct, policies and 
procedures and risk management.  As previously discussed, vicarious liability for the corrupt 
practices of agents and employees of the corporation can serve as a powerful incentive for the 
board and management to provide the leadership and direction necessary for a business respond 
to corruption and bribery in an organized and cohesive manner. This central leadership is 
reinforced and fortified by the work of the audit committee. Internal auditors are responsible for 
exercising due professional care to evaluate the potential for the occurrence of fraud across 
various parts of a business. When fraud, including foreign corrupt practices, occurs, they also 
play an essential role in identifying and responding to such conduct.241   
 
The use of internal and external audit services to address corrupt payments faces challenges.  In 
contrast to fraud, corrupt payment or bribes are not necessarily detrimental to the short-run 
performance of the business or interests of shareholders.242  Consequently, the traditional role of 
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auditors in reviewing the accuracy of financial statements to ensure that the company and by 
extension shareholders are not misinformed as to its current financial position, does not appear to 
apply to the same extent with corrupt payments that may not have a material impact on the 
profitability or cash flow of the company or alternatively may be fully reflected in the financial 
statements under a catch-all line-item.  The losers in this instance are the citizens of the country 
where the bribe is received and not necessarily the business providing the illegal payment.  
However, the skill-set of auditors acquires renewed value when they are required to assess and 
comment upon the efficacy of internal controls designed to mitigate corruption risk within an 
organization.  
 
Audit services traditionally operate to ensure the absence of material misstatements in financial 
reporting by testing internal controls.  Consequently, to the extent that bribes are properly 
accounted for in an issuer’s financial statements and the payment of such bribes do not constitute 
a failure of a risk management procedure or internal financial control, auditors are thus under no 
obligation to report these payments to authorities or withhold their audit opinion if they uncover 
instances of foreign corrupt practices.243  Alternatively, when the payment of these bribes 
involves multiple authorities within the corporation, it may not be possible for the auditor to 
identify any improprieties in the transactions in the first instance.  This risk is compounded by 
traditional audit practices which discourage auditors from going ‘beyond the books.’244  
Consequently, regulatory effectiveness stands to benefit from increased publicity and scrutiny of 
the foreign practices of Canadian businesses through traditional government regulatory channels 
by way of enforcement and ongoing dialogue as well as non-governmental organizations.  
 
Effective gatekeeper regimes and compliance structures depend on a clear understanding of the 
nature of foreign corrupt practices and the steps that businesses can take to reduce the risks of 
employees engaging in these practices.  In addition to empowering gatekeepers and introducing 
multiple layers of controls, Canada’s regulatory regime would be strengthened by a stronger 
dialogue between both criminal and civil regulators and businesses engaged in commerce in 
jurisdictions with high corruption risk.  This would require moving the Canadian CFPOA beyond 
a purely criminal law statute to encompass broader aspects of international trade and commerce.  
To this end, it is suggested that Canadian government adopt the American or British model for 
requiring corporations to develop adequate internal controls to address corruption risk within 
their business.   
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b. Securities Laws: Using Mandatory Disclosure as a Catalyst for Behavioural 
Reforms 
 
Securities law disclosure provides an alternate mechanism that could help promote enhanced 
compliance and the development of a system of progressive regulation. Canadian securities laws 
operate to protect investors, enhance the efficiency of the Canadian capital markets and promote 
confidence in the market.  Reporting issuers are obligated to provide “full, true and plain 
disclosure of all material facts” in any offering materials.245 Put in another way, they must 
provide the market place with information that would affect the share price or affect the 
investment decision of a reasonable investor.   Expanding the interpretation of these general tests 
to require disclosure of anti-corruption risks and policies would introduce a new governance 
mechanism designed to make issuer’s more accountable and responsive towards corruption risk 
within their firms. Alternatively, a specific disclosure requirement could be introduced for anti-
corruption risk measures, which would have the same effect.  Either approach would facilitate 
private securities enforcement where issuers misrepresent the robustness of their internal 
compliance regimes.246 
 
Canadian securities laws do not currently impose a specific requirement on reporting issuers to 
disclose their policies and controls designed to address foreign corrupt practices, though such 
issues may be captured within a corporations’ audit policies. Corporations are not required to 
specifically discuss, in their securities law disclosure, the controls they have developed to 
mitigate foreign corrupt practices risk.  In the absence of specific regulatory guidance or case law 
stating that such disclosure is material, reporting issuers are generally reluctant to provide 
positive disclosure, as it may ultimately provide a clear basis for liability if the issuer fails to 
satisfy the standards articulated therein.   
 
It has been argued in the context of corporate social and environmental matters that a specific 
securities rule requiring mandatory disclosure was necessary to ensure that issuers would provide 
full disclosure.247 As a result, securities regulators have taken positive steps to provide guidance 
to reporting issuers on the nature and scope of environmental, human rights and corporate social 
responsibility disclosure required under the general disclosure requirements248  Although 
regulators have indicated that this guidance “does not create any new legal requirements”,249 the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990 c.S.5, s.56(1). 
246 Aaron A. Dhir, Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance, and Diversity (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) at 84, 95-98 (disclosure requirements can serve to “shame” companies into developing effective 
compliance programs and promote the development of a governance framework that transcends “traditional punitive and 
deterrence-based measures”); Cynthia Williams, “The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency” 
(1999) 112 Hav L.R. 1197 at 1269 (citing Justice Brandies who viewed disclosure as a remedy to “social and industrial disease” 
whereby “sunlight …[being] one of the best disinfectants”). 
247 Ibid.  
248 See: Canadian Securities Administrators Staff Notice 51-133 – Environmental Reporting Guidance (October 27, 2010); Form 
41-101F1 – Information Required in a Prospectus, Items 5.1(4), 21.1(1). 
249 Ibid. CSA Staff Notice 51-333 at 1. 
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tacit recognition that such disclosure may be material lends credibility and may facilitate broader 
disclosure of these issues.250 
As well, to leave no doubts about public companies mandatory disclosure obligations, securities 
regulators have clarified particular items that must be disclosed. For example, reporting issuers 
are now required, in their annual information forms, to disclose the impact of environmental 
regulation on the company’s operations and describe fundamental environmental and social 
policies “within the communities in which it does business”.251  
 
Mandatory disclosure has the capacity to promote a culture of compliance, thereby shifting a 
portion of the burden associated with enforcing the anti-corruption regulations onto market 
participants.252  Expanding or clarifying securities law disclosure requirements to obligate issuers 
to provide disclosure regarding their foreign corrupt practices compliance risk and internal 
controls would provide a powerful incentive for management and the board to evaluate existing 
controls, identify potential risks and ensure that their policies are implemented in a manner 
consistent with the company’s public disclosure.  In this manner, the act of disclosure per se can 
promote greater awareness among management and directors of a corporation, thereby 
facilitating a positive behavioural shift in line with the regulator’s goals.253  Moreover, 
establishing public disclosure requirements for publicly listed companies may have positive 
spinoff benefits for the recognition of directors’ duties to take reasonable steps to address foreign 
corrupt practices.  In particular, such disclosure may assist in making foreign corrupt practices 
risk a commonplace element of the duties of directors of multinational corporations.   
 
Secondly, this disclosure provides a mechanism for private enforcement if a company 
misrepresents the quality of its internal controls.  As noted above, reporting issuers are obligated 
to provide “full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts” in any offering materials.254  To 
the extent that any issuer misrepresents such a material fact either by making an untrue statement 
or failing to state a material fact that is necessary to ensure that a statement is not misleading in 
the circumstances,255 the issuer may face primary or secondary market liability.256  The threat of 
a securities class action resulting from a misrepresentation can provide a powerful deterrent, 
promote accountability, privatize a portion of the investigative and regulatory costs associated 
with a particular issue and provide behavioural catalyst for reporting issuers.257  In doing so, 
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private securities law enforcement provides an additional layer of gradation on the regulatory 
pyramid between a purely compliance based regulatory framework and criminal enforcement 
under the Canadian CFPOA.  
 
Canadian private regulation of foreign corrupt practices is in its early stages.  To date, the 
Canadian class action bar has been reluctant to maintain claims against companies engaged in 
foreign corruption.  However, an ongoing claim against SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. (“SNC-
Lavalin”) for $1 billion in damages, has the potential to expand the regulatory scope of the 
Canadian anti-corruption regime.258  In this action, the plaintiffs claim that SNC-Lavalin and its 
officers and directors should be liable for damages resulting from corrupt payments made in 
contravention of SNC-Lavalin’s internal policies and public statements.  In particular, in these 
statements, SNC-Lavalin maintained that it was a “socially responsible company” and had 
properly operating controls, policies and practices sufficient to ensure compliance with the 
standards articulated therein.259  As a result of these alleged misrepresentations, SNC-Lavalin’s 
financial statements are alleged to have been materially false and/or misleading and to have 
exposed SNC-Lavalin to material risks of criminal and regulatory actions and severe reputational 
damages that have “compromised SNC’s ability to procure new business, particularly in 
developing countries.”260  
 
Although the SNC-Lavalin class action has not yet proceeded to trial, it represents a novel foray 
into a new sphere of foreign corrupt practices private litigation in Canada.  To this end, private 
enforcement of anti-corruption governance standards has the potential to significantly expand the 
scope and character of Canada’s foreign corrupt practices regime.  Moreover, the prospect of 
potential securities law liability for corporate governance disclosure should serve as a cautionary 
tale for directors and officers of reporting issuers that the failure to ensure internal conduct 
accurately reflects such disclosure may provide the basis for future securities litigation.  
 
c. Communication between Regulators and Market Participants 
 
Finally, Canada’s anti-corruption regime would benefit from the development or regulations and 
guidance documents designed to assist corporations and individuals engaged in business abroad 
in understanding their obligations under the Canadian CFPOA.  In particular, the United States’ 
guide details the factors to be considered by the SEC and Department of Justice when 
considering whether to open an investigation or bring charges under the U.S. FCPA, including 
whether the alleged act is widespread within the industry as well as the extent to which the target 
of the investigation has made timely disclosure of the conduct and cooperated with the SEC or 
Department of Justice’s inquiries as they relate to both civil and criminal investigations. 261  The 
guide also provides a series of factors to be applied by the SEC and Department of Justice and 
considered by corporations in adopting a corporate compliance program, including the 
importance of buy-in from senior management and the development of a corporate culture which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 The Trustees of the Drywall Acoustic Lathing and Insulation Local 675 Pension Fund and 0793094 Ltd. v. SNC-Lavalin 
Group Inc. et al., CV-12-453236-00CP (Ont. S.C.) at para. 5. 
259 Ibid at paras. 9-10. 
260 Ibid at paras. 11-2. 
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discourages offending conduct.262  To this end, the guide highlights the need for effective and 
independent oversight mechanisms capable of fully assessing risk factors within the organization 
as well as training offered to employees and the use of positive incentives and negative 
deterrents.263  Similarly, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Justice produces a guidance 
document for the U.K. Bribery Act, which addresses the relevant procedures that corporations 
can put into place to discharge their obligation to develop a corporate compliance program under 
the legislation.264  These guidance documents could serve as a template for Canadian officials in 
developing a more robust regulatory framework designed to promote compliance and address the 
risk of corruption by Canadian businesses through proactive compliance measures.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Strengthening Canadian regulation of foreign corrupt practices will promote sustainable 
economic development abroad and provide long-term stability and legal certainty for Canadian 
multinational corporations. In the absence of effective regulation, the immediate business 
advantages to be gained through bribery lead many organizations to favour short-term profit over 
sustainable growth. This problem is compounded by the difficulties inherent in detecting and 
investigation corrupt business practices abroad, which make it unlikely that any given bribe will 
be discovered. Yet in aggregate, corrupt business practices destabilize foreign jurisdictions, 
resulting in the loss of profits and opportunities for the businesses operating within them. 
Overcoming this collective action problem requires a strong anti-corruption scheme designed to 
reduce the supply of Canadian corporations willing to participate in bribery abroad.  
 
A comparison of the Canadian CFPOA with the corresponding British and American legislation 
demonstrates the benefits of making use of the full regulatory pyramid, from high-profile 
criminal prosecutions to lower-level civil fines, to address the supply side of corruption. 
Criminal provisions play an important role at the apex of this scheme. Consequently, 
development of more consistent sentencing under the Act and a greater willingness to hold the 
orchestrators of bribes – rather than their corporations or intermediaries – accountable will help 
strengthen Canada’s anti-corruption regime. The ability to hold corporations vicariously liable 
for bribery on the part of their employees, present under the British and American legislation, is 
also essential. Limiting liability to the actions of a rogue employee when those actions were 
facilitated by a permissive corporate culture allows the underlying cause of corruption to remain 
unchecked. The introduction of a vicarious liability provision into the Canadian CFPOA, 
prosecution of all responsible parties, and increased consistency in sentencing will strengthen the 
top of the regulatory pyramid of Canada’s anti-corruption regime.  
 
Though the criminal provisions are vital, due to the enforcement difficulties discussed, criminal 
prosecution alone does not effectively motivate corporations to take action to ensure that their 
executives and employees do not participate in bribery. Twice as many corruption schemes are 
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revealed worldwide by companies themselves as are detected by law enforcement.265 To this end, 
failing to recognize the unique ability of corporations to prevent and detect corruption internally 
significantly limits the capability and effectiveness of an anti-corruption regime. The Canadian 
anti-corruption framework could be vastly improved through the implementation of measures 
designed to motivate corporations to develop a culture of compliance, implement internal 
controls, and create confidential avenues for individuals to report corruption internally. 
Especially in a context of asymmetrical regulation where only the supply-side of the bribery of 
foreign public officials is within Canadian jurisdiction, a comprehensive approach to motivating 
compliance within Canadian firms is required to prevent them from engaging in corrupt business 
practices aboard.  
	  
This paper has proposed the use of corporate law directors duties, securities law mandatory 
disclosure requirements, and enhanced communication between the regulator and those that are 
regulated to achieve this objective. Directors’ duties to act with reasonable care and in the best 
interests of the corporation arguably already encompass a responsibility to address corruption 
risk. Developing this duty, either statutorily or through case law, would provide a powerful 
motivator for corporate boards to implement internal controls and ensure that the “tone at the 
top” does not condone corruption. The extension of existing securities mandatory disclosure 
requirements to include a companies’ anti-corruption measures would provide further incentives 
for corporate directors and managers to address corruption risk.  Moreover, when the bribery 
does take place, a company’s past disclosure of its’ anti-corruption policies will support private 
enforcement efforts by providing a basis for securities class actions. Finally, the development of 
effective communication between regulators and Canadian companies will help managers and 
directors understand how to fulfil their obligations. Facilitating compliance and the development 
of best practices, rather than focusing exclusively on criminal prosecution, will help engage 
Canadian corporations in the international effort to prevent bribery of foreign public officials.  
 
The use of Canadian corporate law directors duties’, securities mandatory disclosure 
requirements, and regulatory guidance to develop a more robust pyramid of anti-corruption 
legislation will benefit both Canadian corporations and the international community. These 
mechanisms should assist in reducing the Canadian supply of bribes as Canadian corporations 
are incentivized to develop stronger internal anti-corruption measures. In doing so, it will 
promote competitive markets, reinforce the rule of law, and encourage political and economic 
stability in the countries that Canadian multinational corporations serve.   
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